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 1 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
This research report assesses the aims, operation and outcomes so far of the pilot 
programme for the voluntary Right to Buy (VRTB) for housing association tenants in 
England. The introduction of the right to buy (RTB) for eligible tenants in specified 
housing association dwellings was a manifesto commitment by the Conservative 
party for the 2015 general election and was reiterated in the Queen’s Speech in May 
2015, when the Government made a commitment to introduce legislation to 'support 
home ownership and give housing association tenants the chance to own their own 
home' (Cabinet Office, 2015). In October 2015, the government accepted a proposal 
by the National Housing Federation (NHF) on behalf of its members to deliver this 
commitment by way of voluntary agreement rather than legislation. In November 
2015 the VRTB pilot scheme was set up by the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG). This has now been followed by the announcement of an 
expanded regional pilot VRTB programme.  
Certain aspects for the financing of the full VRTB scheme formed part of the Housing 
and Planning Bill, which received Royal Assent on 12 May 2016 after extensive 
discussion in both Houses of Parliament.  The financial regulations which have been 
enacted so far concern the granting of discounts on sales by the Secretary of State 
to housing associations.  Other terms for funding the programme, including the use 
of proceeds from the sale of 'high value' council homes, require statutory instruments 
which have yet to be laid.  Apart from the discounts, all other funding for the initial 
pilot VRTB programme was provided by DCLG.1 The Chancellor recently announced 
the launch of the large scale regional pilot of the VRTB scheme in the Autumn 
Statement on November 23rd 2016.  It is not known at this stage how this might differ 
in detail from the pilot programme discussed here, but it will test out the issues of the 
portable discount and one-for-one replacements not included in this pilot scheme.  
This research was designed as an action-learning project, examining issues as they 
arose during the evolution of the pilot programme and focusing on the lessons that 
could be learned for the nationwide scheme. The research was never intended as a 
formal evaluation of the pilot programme. Instead, the aims of research (discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2) were to identify lessons from the pilot programme, to  
                                               
1
 This did not include funding for the action research study, which was provided by the National Housing 
Federation and the five pilot housing associations. 
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assess the implications for the operation of the national roll-out of the scheme and to 
estimate future take-up and demand for VRTB through statistical modelling. 
This report is concerned with the first two of these three aims. It is too early to 
undertake a robust assessment of the implications of VRTB for future demand, 
taking account of local housing markets, the demographic profile of households, the 
size and type of stock and the cost consequences for discounts and replacements. 
At the time of writing (November 2016) there had been 81 completions through the 
pilot programme. We estimate that any modelling about the future impact nationally 
of the VRTB programme should be undertaken once several hundred completions 
have occurred. This figure is likely to be reached in early 2017. There will, therefore, 
be a supplementary report from the research team on the issues of take-up and 
demand when there have been sufficient completions in the pilot programme. 
1.2. The VRTB scheme 
National schemes to give local authority tenants the RTB go back to the early 1980s 
but housing association tenants were not included2 at this stage.3  The intention to 
extend the right to buy to such a diverse sector raised a host of complex practical 
and operational issues.  There are more than 1500 housing associations, each with 
their own Board, and ranging in size from the many small associations with less than 
ten properties to the large associations with more than 40,000 properties.  After 
extensive debate and negotiation, in early October 2015 the government accepted 
the proposal by the National Housing Federation to introduce a voluntary right to buy 
scheme. This followed a consultation undertaken by NHF of its 584 members.  Fifty 
five per cent of associations (owning over 90 per cent of the total housing stock in 
the sector) accepted the invitation to sign up, six per cent declined and 39 per cent 
abstained or did not respond.  
The VRTB proposal that the government accepted was based on four key principles. 
 Right to buy discounts for housing association tenants: housing association 
tenants would have the right to purchase a home at Right to Buy level discounts 
– subject to funding for the scheme.   Board control over which homes to sell: housing associations will have the final 
decision about whether to sell an individual property, with the presumption that 
they will sell a tenant their current home where they can.   Full compensation: housing associations will get the full market value of the 
properties sold, with the value of the discount funded by the Government.   Flexible one for one replacement: nationally, for every home sold under the 
agreement a new affordable property would be built, thereby increasing overall 
supply. Some housing associations may not be able to build at a ratio of one for 
one, or in limited circumstances have to rely on acquisitions or bringing empty 
                                               
2
  with the exception of secure tenant in non-charitable housing associations.  Those tenants who were formerly 
qualifying tenants of local authorities that have since transferred their stock to housing associations also remain 
eligible, under the Preserved Right to Buy (PRTB) 
3
 For a full history of RTB, see sources such as: Murie, A. (2016). 
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homes back into use, but it is expected that this will be balanced by others 
delivering to a higher ratio and that, nationally, the target will be met. The type 
and location of replacements will be flexible, according to their needs. 
In summary, the VRTB is seeking to extend the existing RTB scheme to housing 
association tenants.  However, the terms of eligibility are different and, as seen 
above, under the full scheme associations have the discretion not to sell a particular 
property but instead offer an alternative home to buy.  In the national scheme, the 
costs to the government of funding the discounts given to tenants exercising the 
VRTB are to be met from the proceeds from the sale of high value council homes.  
The provisions of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 enabled the Secretary of State 
to pay the discounts arising from VRTB sales.  All the detailed provisions of the 
scheme were delegated to the Secretary of State to determine at a future date. 
DCLG launched the pilot scheme of the VRTB with five housing associations in late 
November 2015, in order to test out the policy in advance of its implementation. The 
pilot programme diverges from both the existing statutory RTB and the forthcoming 
national VRTB scheme in some important ways (see Chapter 3 for more detail).  The 
most important difference from the existing scheme is that tenants are required to 
have at least ten years' experience as a tenant in the social housing sector to qualify 
for VRTB.  This compares to a minimum of three years for tenants in the local 
authority RTB.  The other significant difference between the pilot programme and the 
forthcoming national VRTB programme is that it does not involve a portable discount 
for tenants who live in excluded properties.   
For the pilot programme, a portal was established on the DCLG website where 
tenants in the pilot associations could register an interest to take up the VRTB.  If 
their eligibility was confirmed at this stage, the individual housing associations then 
managed their application from that point onward.   Successful applicants were be 
able to progress their application up to the point of a provisional offer being made, 
but no contractual commitment could be entered into at this stage. The applicant 
could only continue through to purchase once the Housing and Planning Bill was 
enacted in May 2016. The scope and funding of the pilot programme was limited to a 
maximum of 600 completed sales. The pilots started accepting applications in 
January 2016 from those who had registered an interest in VRTB.  The research 
team started the action-learning project in February 2016.  
While there was considerable speculation about the potential impact of extending the 
RTB to the housing association sector, the most substantial appraisal was 
undertaken by the Communities and Local Government (CLG) (select) Committee.  
The Committee undertook its inquiry during Autumn 2015 and published its report in 
February 2016 (CLG Committee, 2016). The Committee report recognised that the 
voluntary deal was a way of delivering a key policy from the Government’s manifesto 
whilst maintaining the independence of housing associations. This report raised 
questions about various aspects of the policy: the extent of the discretion for housing 
associations to decline sales; the protection of affordable housing in rural areas and 
how portable discounts would operate; funding of RTB discounts from the proceeds 
from the sale of high value council homes; how the objective of one-to-one 
replacements for sold homes would be met. However, most of these issues lie 
outside the scope of the pilot programme. 
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1.3. Structure of the report 
In the following chapter we outline the research team's action-learning approach in 
more detail. Chapter 3 discusses the design of the pilot programme and the 
characteristics of the five pilot housing associations. Chapter 4 outlines the delivery 
of the programme and the progress that has been made so far in processing 
applications, from the initial expression of interest through to assessment of eligibility, 
valuation, offer and completion. The following four chapters (5 to 8) draw on both 
online surveys and qualitative interviews with applicants to assess, in turn: 
applicants' experience of the VRTB process, their motivations for wanting to buy their 
homes, the level of demand for VRTB in different pilots and whether interested 
tenants could afford to buy. Chapter 9 profiles the tenants involved in the pilot 
programme and compares them to other tenants within their housing associations. 
Finally, in Chapter 10, we reflect on the main lessons and messages to emerge from 
the pilot programme so far.  
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 5 
 
2 2. About the Research 
The research team from Sheffield Hallam University and the University of Sheffield 
started work in February 2016, two months after the pilot programme had been 
announced.  As stated earlier, the project was based on an action-learning approach 
and focused on providing useful lessons about the policy from an independent 
standpoint. This approach was considered appropriate to maximise the opportunity 
to inform the progress of the pilots and the development of the wider VRTB 
programme. To this end, the team produced a series of Learning Bulletins on various 
issues of policy and practice. These bulletins were supplemented by ongoing contact 
with the NHF, with each of the pilots and participation in the regular meetings of the 
Pilot Project Operational Working Group (see Chapter 3).  
The action learning during the pilot programme used a range of sources to collect 
data. These included: 
 Stakeholder interviews with officers in the pilot associations.  A range of 
officers in each of the pilot housing associations were contacted at regular 
interviews to record their experiences of the process and identify emerging 
trends. These issues included the use of management data, marketing and 
communications, managing exclusions, and variations in the process used to 
progress applications through the system to completion.   Management information. The housing associations recorded a range of data 
during the pilot programme. This included progress data on Expressions of 
Interest, applications, valuations and completions.  Online survey to tenants. 3,450 tenants who expressed an interest in VRTB 
were contacted with an online survey. The survey collected a range of data 
about tenants and their experience of the VRTB pilot. A different set of 
questions were asked to three sub-groups: those who made an application, 
those who had not made an application but might do so later in the programme, 
and those who did not intend to apply. The survey was sent out in two waves 
during April and August 2016. In total there were 668 responses to the survey 
which could be included in the analysis. This represented a strong overall 
response rate (19 per cent) and included 29 per cent of all applicants.4 The 
number of survey responses from each pilot was largely in line with the number 
of Expressions of Interest they had received. 
                                               
4
 Based on the number of applicants and expressions of interest in August 2016, including rejected applicants. 
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 Follow-up survey to tenants. A follow-up survey was sent out to 409 tenants 
who had responded to the first wave of the online tenant survey. This survey 
investigated the progress of tenants through the application process. It led to 
126 responses, which represented a response rate of 31 per cent of those 
contacted.   Qualitative interviews with tenants. A selection of tenants who responded to 
the online survey were contacted for in-depth follow-up telephone interviews. 
This allowed more detailed exploration of certain issues, such as their main 
motivations for applying for VRTB, their experience of the process and their 
financial position to enable purchase. Thirty four interviews were undertaken, 
across the pilots: twenty four of these covered households from either L&Q or 
Riverside, as these two associations had generated the largest response from 
tenants and accounted for more than 80 percent of all applications processed by 
the pilots (see Table 4.1).   Analysis of application forms. Initial application forms submitted by tenants 
were analysed to assess the characteristics of households and the stock being 
purchased. Analysis was undertaken of the application forms received up to 
mid-April 2016. Sovereign used an online only process for applications whilst 
tenants in the other pilots completed paper forms. A total of 428 application 
forms were included in the analysis with a small number excluded due to issues 
with data quality.  
The results from the different data sources were used to triangulate findings. This 
meant that it was possible to gain more detailed understanding of the pilot process. It 
was also possible to combine data from the different sources to undertake additional 
analysis. For example, the affordability of VRTB for tenants was assessed using data 
from management information, the online survey and application forms. 
In addition, the research team kept in touch with the ongoing development of the pilot 
programme through visits to each of the pilots, discussions with lead officers and, in 
some cases, with front-line staff. These staff members were responsible for 
interviewing applicants and processing applications. The research team attended a 
marketing event held by one of the pilots to offer advice to applicants and promote 
awareness of the VRTB scheme. Research team members also attended and 
participated in meetings of the Pilot Projects Operations Working Group.  The pilot 
associations had responsibility for agreeing on the design of the programme (over 
such issues as property exclusions, terms of sales, conditions for agreeing the 'ten 
years eligibility rule' and commissioning the action research).  The Working Group 
met regularly to monitor progress and discuss any issues that had arisen in the 
course of the pilot programme. Draft findings from the research (learning bulletins 
and an interim research report in May 2016) were presented at various junctures to 
the Working Group.  An interim research report and a presentation based on this 
report were also presented to a meeting of the Sounding Board, which had been set 
up to contribute to the development of the national VRTB scheme (see Chapter 3).  
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3 3. The Design of the Pilot 
VRTB Programme 
3.1. The VRTB agreement  
The VRTB was agreed between the National Housing Federation and the 
Government in October 2015. It was designed to allow housing associations to meet 
the Government’s manifesto commitment to extend Right to Buy discounts to their 
tenants by way of a voluntary agreement rather than through legislation. 
The voluntary agreement and the selection of the five pilot associations were 
secured against a very tight timetable so the arrangements could be confirmed in 
advance of the 2015 Autumn Statement.  
3.2. The pilot housing associations 
DCLG invited five housing associations covering a range of different markets and 
operating environments to take part in testing the scheme. The five pilot housing 
associations then selected certain areas for inclusion in the VRTB pilot programme 
(see Table 3.1 below).  The selection of the pilot associations was made to cover 
reasonable geographical spread across the country and to include both large and 
relatively small associations.  The eventual choice of the five Associations also relied 
on personal contacts in bringing together a 'coalition of the willing' who were 
prepared to test out the VRTB programme.  The pilot associations then selected 
certain local authority areas in which they operated (see Table 3.1 below) rather than 
covering every area where they owned stock.  Overlaps in geographical coverage 
between associations were avoided. For example, the areas covered by the Thames 
Valley pilot were different to areas covered by L&Q and Sovereign, even though 
these associations held stock in many of the same locations. The remainder of this 
section outlines the characteristics of the five pilot associations. This highlights the 
differences in geography, size of organisation and reasons for their involvement in 
the pilot.5 
                                               
5
 Quotes are from interviews with officers within the pilot housing associations. 
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Table 3.1: The Pilot Housing Associations 
Housing Association  Location of stock (by local authority area ) 
L&Q  London Boroughs (LB)  
LB Croydon 
LB Enfield 
LB Greenwich 
LB Haringey 
LB Lambeth 
LB Lewisham 
LB Newham 
LB Southwark 
The Riverside Group Ltd. Liverpool City Region Combined Authority Area 
Liverpool City Council 
Halton Borough Council 
Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council 
Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council 
St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council 
Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council 
Saffron Housing Association  South Norfolk District Council 
Sovereign Housing Association Cherwell District Council 
West Oxfordshire District Council 
Vale of White Horse District Council 
South Oxfordshire District Council 
Thames Valley Housing 
Association  
Guildford Borough Council 
Hart District Council 
Runnymede Borough Council 
Rushmoor Borough Council 
Woking Borough Council 
L&Q (London and Quadrant) housing association has a stock of over 70,000 
properties across London and the South East and is the largest social landlord in 
London. Its origins date back to the formation of Quadrant housing association in 
October 1963, based in Greenwich. Quadrant joined with London Housing Trust in 
1973 and L&Q was formed.  By the late 1980s L&Q owned more than 10,000 homes 
and continued to develop in the 1990s and 2000s through acquisitions, mergers and 
new schemes. In 2016 its stock of 70,000 properties included 54,000 social 
tenancies. Forty thousand of these tenancies are based in London. In Lewisham, for 
example, L&Q has 6,000 properties. L&Q continues to develop its portfolio, 
exemplified by the recently announced Barking Riverside development of 11,000 
properties, and its joint venture to develop homes in partnership with Trafford 
Housing Trust in the North West.  
The decision to select L&Q for the pilot programme stemmed in part from the role of 
L&Q's Chief Executive, David Montague, as a member of the NHF Board. Although 
NHF were not involved in the selection process, he had been closely involved in the 
rapid development of the VRTB idea through this role on the NHF Board. L&Q's 
Board supported the idea of becoming involved in the pilot to 'be involved in shaping 
the (eventual) policy and the process'. Their pilot area covers eight local authorities 
in London. L&Q dedicated additional staffing to the pilot in order to be able to 
manage an anticipated high level of demand effectively. L&Q also concentrated on 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 9 
investing resource in engaging with and updating local authorities, particularly given 
the critical reaction of many London Boroughs to the idea of extending RTB to 
housing associations when it was announced. L&Q’s involvement in the pilot was 
also supported by the G15 group of major London housing associations (which was 
being chaired by L&Q at the time of the launch of the pilot). 
The initial indicative allocation of properties in the pilot programme for L&Q was 100, 
later increased to 150 because of the very high level of interest from tenants (see 
Section 4.1).  One of the reasons for L&Q joining the pilot scheme was to road test 
more efficient procedures for managing VRTB including progressing applications, 
securing valuations and undertaking fraud checks. Processing a preserved RTB6 
application had taken L&Q around 42 weeks in the past. One of the aims of VRTB 
was to lower transaction costs and speed up the application process, if possible to 
just 12 weeks. Limits had to be placed as a result on the number of applicants active 
in the system at any one time.  
The Riverside Group Ltd. Owns and manages nearly 52,640 properties (of which 
36,000 are general needs rented stock). Riverside operates across 160 local 
authorities from Kent to the Isle of Arran. Riverside started out as Liverpool Improved 
Houses in 1928 and became Merseyside Improved Houses in 1973 and was then 
renamed Riverside Housing Association in 1996. Riverside has expanded 
considerably since the 1990s, through a combination of mergers and take-overs, and 
expansion through development and stock transfer.  It created a group structure in 
the early 2000s under a parent association, The Riverside Group Ltd.  It has an 
active development programme of around 700 properties per year, which includes 
rented properties, shared ownership and low cost home ownership schemes and 
properties for outright sale. Riverside has preserved RTB tenants and also sells 
properties as part of their asset management strategy 'where it is strategic to do so'. 
To some extent the incorporation of VRTB within the association's portfolio of 
activities was seen as 'business as usual'. The organisation had the processes in 
place and the staff expertise from other sales activity to deal with this additional 
strand of work. 
The pilot area covers 21,000 Riverside properties across six local authority areas. Of 
these, 6,519 properties were deemed eligible for VRTB in the pilot and inhabited by 
tenants likely to be eligible (i.e. with the requisite length of tenancy). Around half the 
properties in the pilot area are in the 10 per cent most deprived neighbourhoods in 
England, and average property values are low (see section 8.4). Riverside agreed to 
take part because, according to one stakeholder, it was an opportunity 'to get ahead 
of the game', providing an opportunity to learn and be prepared for the main scheme. 
The terms of sale under the pilot programme were likely to be slightly more 
advantageous than arrangements for a national scheme and this was also cited as a 
reason for taking part.  
Senior officers in Riverside initially contemplated linking the pilot scheme directly to 
their asset management strategy by targeting the offer to specific areas and 
properties, but they subsequently opted for general coverage in order to generate a 
more realistic estimate of demand.  There is no rural stock in the Riverside pilot 
                                               
6
 See Appendix 2 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 10 
areas.  A small number of properties were excluded where regeneration work is 
imminent, along with a further 900 properties that were part of a particular funding 
portfolio with legal complexities over their covenants.  It was decided to select local 
authorities that lay within the Liverpool City Region for the pilot - partly because of 
the concentration of housing stock in that area and the range of local housing market 
conditions it covered.  The selection also enabled Riverside to undertake a more 
strategic conversation with the local authorities involved, in the light of emerging 
'Combined Authority' structures. 
A letter about the pilot scheme was sent to the 19,299 properties in scope. Riverside 
has not undertaken much further publicity or marketing, other than contacting those 
who had originally expressed an interest but had not followed up with an application.  
The association was 'inundated' with expressions of interest from tenants and nearly 
600 applications had been processed by November 2016 - far more than any of the 
other pilots. Riverside had agreed to an allocation of 200 completed sales in the pilot 
programme, but this was later increased to 250.  Additional staff were taken on to 
help process applications. Officers provided relatively limited advice and support to 
applicants going through the process. This was partly a pragmatic decision, in terms 
of capacity and cost.  A conscious decision had also been taken to provide limited 
advice and support to applicants in order to place responsibility for taking the 
purchase forward with the applicant – to make it a ‘proper market experience’ for 
them.  A similar approach to applicants has been undertaken by other pilots, such as 
Sovereign.  
Saffron Housing Association was formed in 2004 as a result of a large-scale 
voluntary transfer from South Norfolk District Council. The association has housing 
stock across East Anglia (5,600 dwellings in total) but only included their stock in the 
South Norfolk local authority area for the pilot. Saffron's housing stock includes 
former council estates in market towns, dispersed settlements and some individual 
houses. About 10-15 tenants a year exercise the Preserved Right to Buy. At the time 
of the pilot programme launch Saffron had an active development programme (490 
units on a range of sites), with a high proportion of section 106 properties, as well 
infill properties and schemes on rural exceptions sites. Around 1,000 of the 4,800 
properties in the pilot area are S106 properties.  
Saffron was included in the pilot programme relatively late in the process and was 
partly selected because of the rural context in which it operates. Officers from 
Saffron were enthusiastic about piloting VRTB and it was seen as a chance to invest 
in housing stock as part of active asset management planning and to ensure that 
their housing stock was better aligned with local demand (for example on issues 
such as the availability of one bed properties and dwellings for assisted living). 
Saffron contacted the 1600 households who were eligible for the pilot by letter. There 
was little further marketing undertaken by the housing association.  Saffron agreed to 
an initial allocation of 50 completed sales in the programme, later reduced to 40. 
Sovereign Housing Association began life as West Berkshire Housing Association 
in 1989 following a stock transfer from the then Newbury District Council. From the 
outset, Sovereign was an active developer; it was renamed Sovereign in 1994, and 
the association continued to grow through acquisitions, transfers and new 
developments. During the period covered by this report, Sovereign's stock of 37,000 
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properties was mainly distributed across small-scale development in market towns 
and rural areas. Around 20 per cent of Sovereign's current activity was concerned 
with home ownership and shared ownership, and the remaining eighty per cent with 
affordable/social rent. Sovereign's housing stock includes four stock transfers from 
local authorities, of which the largest is Newbury, where the head office is based. 
Sovereign currently has an active development programme and its involvement with 
the VRTB pilot formed part of its wider strategy of diversification and supporting 
sustainable and affordable home ownership. In early November 2016 a merger was 
completed between Sovereign and Spectrum Housing Group, bringing the total 
combined stock to 55,000.  
Sovereign’s Chief Executive Officer welcomed the organisation being part of the pilot. 
While she recognised involvement in the pilot would place additional pressures on 
employees, she believed the experience would be invaluable in preparing for the 
national scheme.  Sovereign placed great emphasis on developing an innovative 
digital housing service and its involvement in the pilot programme was an opportunity 
to demonstrate the value of a digitally based approach for communicating, 
processing and advancing VRTB applications.  
Sovereign's housing stock in Oxfordshire (other than Oxford city, where it only has a 
few properties) was selected for the pilot programme. The development programme 
included a number of Oxfordshire schemes, which meant that the area was seen as 
a potential area for strategic development, and could be the focus of any new 
provision from reinvested receipts. This stock did not differ markedly in terms of 
prices and rent levels from their provision elsewhere. A total of 7,988 households 
lived in the Sovereign pilot area, but, once allowances were made for exclusions and 
PRTB, just 1,601 properties qualified for VRTB.  Sovereign agreed to an initial 
allocation of 200 completed sales in the pilot programme, later reduced to 100. 
Thames Valley Housing Association (TVHA) was set up 50 years ago and 
currently has 14,500 homes (of which 5,700 are rental units) and 26,000 residents. 
The housing stock tends to be distributed across smaller developments of 10 to 15 
units in London, Berkshire, Surrey, Hampshire, Oxfordshire, Wiltshire and Sussex. 
TVHA has established a joint venture subsidiary, Fizzy Living, for its market rent 
activity. Seventy per cent of its 2014/15 development programme was earmarked for 
shared ownership, and 30 per cent for affordable rent. During the course of the pilot 
programme in 2016, TVHA had been involved in detailed discussions about a 
proposed merger with Genesis Housing Group, but the proposed deal was called off 
in September 2016.  
In determining the geographical area to be covered by the TVHA pilot, overlaps were 
avoided with any areas also covered by Sovereign or L&Q. The TVHA pilot is based 
in Woking, Guildford, Rushmore, Runnymede and Hart. This covers only 1,500 
households, of whom 954 are eligible for VRTB, once exclusions were taken into 
account. The TVHA housing stock in the pilot therefore represents markets on the 
London fringe, with values below those in central London but still very high by 
national standards (see section 8.4).   
TVHA was keen to be involved in the pilot to help anticipate the likely impact of a  
national scheme. Extra resources were committed to managing and processing 
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applications and refining data analysis systems. TVHA has undertaken modelling to 
estimate future impacts of VRTB on both the stock and the housing service. At the 
start of the pilot programme, letters were sent to the 954 households who might be 
eligible for VRTB. Aside from follow-up letters, no further promotional work was 
undertaken.  Unlike in the other pilots, applicants did not have to pay the 
administration fee of £250 until they were ready to secure a valuation and were then 
deemed 'firm' applications. The publicity material that was sent out to tenants 
emphasised the financial commitment that would be required if they were to go 
ahead with the purchase, reflecting concerns about high property values and 
affordability in the local market.  TVHA agreed to an initial allocation of 50 completed 
sales in the pilot programme, later reduced to 15.  
Taken together, the five pilot housing associations offered a range of contrasts in 
relation to organisation type, geography, and housing markets. For this reason it is 
important to examine the distinctive experience of each association and their tenants, 
rather than just aggregate applicant responses and stock characteristics across the 
pilots. Of particular interest are the differences between the two largest pilot areas, 
Riverside and L&Q. Both organisations are large, expanding associations, but are 
operating in very different contexts. For example, the mean average value of a 
property in their pilot areas is £93,600 in Riverside, and £374,800 in L&Q.7 These 
differences have obvious ramifications for affordability, the cost of discounts and the 
eventual asset value of the property for applicants.   
3.3. Differences between the pilot programme and the Statutory RTB scheme  
The VRTB policy is often described as the 'extension' of the existing Right to Buy to 
the housing association sector. However, there are some important differences 
between the scheme used in the pilot programme and the existing statutory RTB 
scheme, concerning the eligibility of qualifying tenants and the exclusion of specific 
properties. Housing association tenants who were formerly local authority tenants 
(for example, prior to a stock transfer) remain eligible for the Preserved Right to Buy 
(PRTB) and are not eligible for the pilot VRTB scheme.8 
Tenant Eligibility under the Pilot Programme  
In order to ensure that the number of applicants to the pilot programme was 
manageable, the qualifying period was set at 10 years (not necessarily continuously) 
as a housing association or public sector tenant (including any probationary periods).  
This compares with a qualifying period of three years in the statutory RTB.  
Licensees are excluded from the scheme, although periods as a licensee are 
counted when calculating discounts. The onus was on the applicant to provide 
documentary evidence of their eligibility and tenants were not able to 'evidence' 
length of tenancy by undertaking a statutory declaration. No additional time was 
granted for any family members who may join in the purchase.  
                                               
7
 See chapter 8 for full details. 
8
 See Appendix 2 for a summary of the schemes to support access to owner occupation for social housing 
tenants. 
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Housing associations in the pilot were given a choice on whether to turn down any 
application from those in arrears (except for 'technical' arrears due to benefit 
payment delays), or to accept applications on the condition that the arrears were 
settled prior to completion. In fact, the five housing associations agreed a consistent 
policy on this. Applications were not accepted where there had been a material 
breach of tenancy. All family members must have lived at the property for at least 12 
months to join in the application (to prevent 'carpet bagging'), and this restriction was 
consonant with the emphasis on VRTB being an 'opportunity', not a 'right' in 
comparison with the statutory scheme. If a joint application was made, the 
application process had to be restarted if one party dropped out prior to completion. 
Given the time limited nature of the pilot, and the maximum number of completions 
set, all applications were dealt with on a first come, first served basis. 
Property Exclusions  
The approach to eligibility in the pilot programme, as discussed above, was 
consistent across the five housing associations even where there was room for 
variation (e.g. treatment of tenants in arrears). The framework for determining 
property exclusions, on the other hand, gave the pilot housing associations more 
latitude which produced a degree of variability.  
Certain types of property were excluded from the pilot VRTB, including housing for 
older people, supported housing and housing for disabled people (as defined by the 
housing association concerned).  Rural properties were excluded, based on an 
existing list of excluded parishes for Right to Acquire (RTA) purposes, or a special 
list drawn up by the association. In addition, properties were excluded where Section 
106 or other planning agreements restricted the use of the property (e.g. to 
affordable housing). The reason for excluding such properties was partly pragmatic 
as it would not be possible to secure the consent of the local authorities to varying 
Section 106 conditions within the timetable of the pilot programme.  In addition, other 
properties could be excluded from the process at the discretion of the housing 
association, for reasons such as asset management and redevelopment (for 
example, due to impending demolition, regeneration, change of use or disposal).  
This flexibility was allowed because including such properties might increase costs 
and delays on existing developments or require programmes to be revised. 
There were also restrictions on the sale of properties below the Net Debt, or affected 
by the 'Cost Floor' rule. A sale could not take place where the net debt was greater 
than the market value of the property (as the sale would then cause a financial loss 
to the housing association) and it was prohibited for the net sale price to be lower 
than 15 years of cumulative investment in the property (this contrasts with 10 years 
for the statutory RTB, except for properties built after 2012). In the latter case, the 
property was not excluded but the discount could not reduce the net sale price below 
a certain amount.   
Other exclusions included properties with shared facilities or services (as defined by 
the association) and where there were property covenants or other legal restrictions 
preventing sale. The practice of the pilot associations in terms of exclusions is 
considered more fully below   in section 4.3.  
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A number of restrictions were also introduced in the pilot programme in an effort to 
address some common criticisms of the statutory Right to Buy scheme.  This 
included an optional overage clause if tenants subsequently redevelop or sell for 
redevelopment, and restrictions on sub-letting.  Purchasers were not able to sub-let 
for five years following purchase and there was an option for the housing association 
to restrict permanently sub-letting, even if the property has been sold on by the 
original purchaser. 
3.4. The Governance Structure of the VRTB Programme  
The unique status of the VRTB scheme as a voluntary agreement between the NHF, 
housing associations and the Government brought with it the need for a specific 
framework for policy development. At the centre of this process is the VRTB 
Sounding Board, which is responsible for the design of the overall programme. It is 
made up of housing associations selected to reflect the diversity of the sector,9 the 
DCLG and the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA), and chaired by NHF.  
The Sounding Board receives proposals about different aspects of the scheme from 
two working groups made up of housing association representatives. One of these 
groups, chaired by DCLG, is concerned with applications and sales processes and 
looks at issues such as how the process can be supported and resourced, the 
customer experience, eligibility and fraud prevention. The other group, chaired by 
NHF, is concerned with the policy of one-for-one replacements, which looks at how 
to make the replacement process efficient and applicable to both developing and 
non-developing associations, and how housing associations might work in 
partnership with other organisations to deliver replacements. It is also considering 
how the discount should be paid to housing associations (see Appendix 1 for a 
diagram of these relationships). 
A series of topic-specific workshops were held and any lessons or concerns from 
these discussions were communicated to NHF and DCLG. The workshops have 
covered the following topics: eligibility; portable discounts; legacy stock; charitable 
status; Section 106 and restrictive covenants; Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT) 
issues; rural issues; supported and sheltered housing; smaller housing association 
issues; and fraud.  
The VRTB Sounding Board also receives recommendations and proposals from the 
pilot associations through the Pilot Operations Working Group run by the five pilots 
with NHF and DCLG representation, and a Marketing and Communications Working 
Group. The Sounding Board considers proposals from these groups and the 
workshops and, if it endorses them, makes recommendations accordingly to the 
Secretary of State. Recommendations from the Sounding Board are considered and 
will need to be agreed by ministers in order to be incorporated in the main scheme. 
This will occur in the form of a framework for associations to make decisions about 
how they operate specific aspects of the scheme, given its voluntary nature, to 
ensure that it can be tailored to fit local circumstances. 
                                               
9
 Accent Group, Amicus Horizon, Anchor, Aspire Group, Bromford, First Choice Oldham Homes, Home Group, 
Innisfree, Peabody, Places for People, Shropshire Housing, Sovereign, Town & Country, and L&Q.  
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Having set the framework for the pilot programme, in the next chapter we outline the 
progress that has been made in dealing with applications for the VRTB and the views 
of stakeholders about the process. 
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4 4. Delivering the VRTB pilot 
Programme 
4.1. The Process of Applying for the VRTB pilot 
Potential applicants for VRTB in the pilot areas had to register their interest through a 
central DCLG portal, while giving a preliminary indication that they met the ten year 
eligibility criterion. Their Expression of Interest was then passed on to the housing 
association concerned, and the association then processed the application from that 
point on.  An initial assessment was made of the tenant's eligibility for the scheme, to 
be followed by a more detailed check once an application had been made.  The 
landlord established whether or not the property was within the scope of the scheme. 
In four of the pilots, applicants then needed to pay a £250 administration fee 
(refunded if their property was subsequently excluded from the scheme, or if the sale 
completed successfully, but not if they just withdrew from the process).  The 
administration fee was collected later in the process in the TVHA pilot.  A few 
applicants received an indicative valuation of their property, but the vast majority did 
not. If they were still included in the scheme, their application was then paused until 
after Royal Assent was granted.  Pilot associations received the written approval to 
go ahead with sales in June 2016.  Applicants could then proceed with their 
application and needed to demonstrate that they had secured the necessary 
finances, and have that approved, then instruct their solicitor to complete the legal 
processes necessary to finalise the purchase.  
As had been anticipated, one of the pilots, L&Q, had a very large and potentially 
overwhelming response in terms of expressions of interest when the pilot was 
announced. Over 1,800 expressions of interest were made within two months. As a 
result of this tremendous level of interest, the decision was taken to pause the 
'active' waiting list of those expressing interest, to make it manageable to process 
applications in a measured way and to avoid having to disappoint other applicants 
once they were even further down the line.  As shown later, this decision to 'pause' 
caused considerable frustration among those being held back in the queue, as well 
as prompting speculation from tenants over the 'real reasons' behind the decision.  
L&Q then allowed others to move on to the application stage in tranches, according 
to date order.  By November 2016 this meant that there were still a large number of 
tenants who had expressed an interest but had not moved forward to the application 
stage, such was the level of interest in the scheme. 
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Table 4.1 below shows how many tenants living in eligible properties had moved 
through the various stages to make an application to purchase their property by 3 
November 2016.  Figure 4.1 also highlights the progress with the application process 
across different pilot areas. At this point Riverside accounted for 591 of the 972 
applications processed.  Only a small number of new applications were processed 
between June and early September, but associations then had renewed contact with 
those who had expressed an interest prior to closing the scheme in early October.  
During this period, most of the change resulted from the progress of existing 
applications. As a result, the number of 'offers of discount' increased rapidly from 14 
in early June to 415 by November 3rd. At this time the number of 'solicitors' 
instructions' had also passed 250 and had translated into 81 completions. The very 
first completions in the pilot programme, in L&Q and Riverside properties, were 
made in August 2016. 
Table 4.1: Progress through to applications at 3 November 2016 
L&Q Riverside Saffron Sovereign TVH Total 
Total number of households 
in pilot area 18,667 21,000 4,800 7,988 1,500 53,955 
Eligible households within the 
pilot area 5,712 6,519 1,600 1,601 954 16,386 
Expressions of interest from 
eligible tenants 1,894 1,700 116 555 140 4,405 
Applications processed 219 591 40 103 22 972  
Valuations requested 177 243 37 53 6 516  
Offers of Discount 119 205 37 49 5 415 
Solicitors Instructed 49 158 37 15 4 263 
Completions 25 55 3 1 0 81  
Allocation 150 250 40 100 15 555  
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Figure 4.1: Progress with the VRTB application process, 3 November 2016 
 
Several factors need to be considered when assessing procedure and progress in 
dealing with applications.  First, the pilot associations had to pause the process 
during the period of application until Royal Assent was given to the Housing and 
Planning Bill in May 2016.  Second, the time to process applications took longer than 
originally anticipated. This is understandable, given; i) the scale of the undertaking 
for the applicant, which requires them to give very careful thought to their 
circumstances before proceeding; ii) the novelty of the process; and iii) the need to 
engage others (for example, valuers and solicitors) over the sale of the housing 
association property for the first time. Third, there was also a longer time lag than 
expected between instructions to solicitors being issued and the completion of the 
sale. It is therefore hardly surprising that the number of completions achieved in the 
pilot programme by November 2016 fell below initial expectations of progress when 
the programme was first launched. 
4.2. Differences in approach between the pilots  
The pilot programme gave some opportunity to housing associations to customise 
their approach to dealing with applications. As we have seen, the pilots were 
operating in quite different housing markets. The housing associations were also 
given a degree of discretion on issues such as exclusions and approaches to 
marketing and progress checks with applicants. In initial interviews with the research 
team, officers from the pilots were very clear that a 'one size fits all' approach to 
marketing, processing and managing the VRTB programme would have been 
ineffective, and indeed counter-productive. This raises the wider question about how 
much discretion can be afforded to different practices (for example, over exclusions) 
in the regional pilot and the national programme, especially when different 
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associations will be operating in the same neighbourhood (which is not the case in 
the pilot programme). It remains to be seen how far the regional pilot and the 
national programme will strike a balance between flexibility and prescription, and 
between voluntarism and legalism. 
As it turned out, different pilot associations specialised in different aspects of the 
application process. Sovereign, for example, placed great emphasis on digitising the 
application process and customer engagement, while encouraging applicants to take 
more responsibility in the course of the VRTB process. (In the words of one officer, 
treating VRTB as a 'commercial product' rather than a 'service to tenants'). All pilot 
associations had robust fraud prevention measures in place but L&Q focused on 
developing more far-reaching and intensive fraud protection methods which is 
understandable given the prices that VRTB properties have commanded, even after 
discount.  Most associations required applicants to pay the £250 administration fee 
early in the process, as indicative of serious intent to buy. TVHA levied the fee just 
before a valuation was to be made. The level of interest from tenants in eligible 
properties in the scheme also varied from one pilot to another, as shown above. 
However, all associations referred to the demands on their time and resources of 
managing expectations once applications had been made.  
The associations received a management allowance from DCLG to cover set-up 
costs and then an additional allowance of £2,000 per completed sale,10 to assist with 
coping with the additional workload of administering VRTB.    Because exercising the 
VRTB is the most important financial transaction most applicant households will ever 
make, and because of the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity it offered to them, applicants 
could become very impatient with any delays, even though specified time periods 
were laid down for each phase of the application process. 
4.3. Variability in the Pilot Programme: the Case of Exclusions  
The extent to which the approach of pilot associations could vary is demonstrated by 
strategies for excluding properties. The pilot differed from plans for the full 
programme because the portable discount did not apply, and so there was no 
expectation that alternative purchase options would be offered.  Furthermore, Section 
106 (planning obligation) properties were automatically excluded from the pilot 
programme, not least because there was not time for associations to re-negotiate the 
terms and conditions of each scheme with the local authority or the original developer.    
A national programme with portable discount would add considerably to the 
complexity of decisions about whether to exclude properties with significant added 
workload in dealing with Section 106 agreements and legal covenants and making 
alternative properties available.  
Determining exclusions and eligibility was a complex, sensitive and time consuming 
process even with the restricted scope of the pilot. Respondents expressed particular 
concern about assessing the status of S106 requirements as the data are not always 
up-to-date and readily accessible.  
                                               
10
 £3,500 per sale for properties in the Greater London area 
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Table 4.2 profiles exclusions across the five associations in the pilot programme. The 
proportion of excluded properties varies from 15 to 20 per cent in L&Q to 67 per cent 
in Saffron. The wide variation in the number of excluded homes will be an important 
part of the profile of VRTB as it maps out in the regional pilot and the national 
programme and that will feed into variation in the demand for portable discount 
across housing associations. 
Pilot associations also excluded other properties with contractual obligations that 
were complicated to address within the pilot timescale. Some of the properties in 
scope had PRTB. Those ‘enforced’ exclusions account for the majority of exclusions 
from sale in the Saffron, Riverside, L&Q and Thames Valley pilot areas. The majority 
of exclusions in the Sovereign pilot area are rural properties in parishes exempt from 
the Right to Acquire (covering 28 per cent of properties). 
Variations in the scale and type of exclusion reflect the nature of the housing stock in 
the different pilot areas. Taking property/funding conditions, PRTB and rural 
exclusions out of the equation, the proportion of discretionary exclusions is 12 per 
cent of the pilot housing stock in Riverside and Sovereign and less than five per cent 
in Saffron and Thames Valley. Discretionary exclusions are mainly specialised 
homes for older and disabled people and other forms of supported housing. 
Riverside is considering reducing its exclusions for some aspects of supported 
housing in the eventual national scheme. The challenge of delivering portable 
discounts in the national roll-out may further encourage associations to keep 
discretionary exclusions to a minimum.  
Nationally there has been discussion about the importance of exclusions for rural 
housing and the definition of 'rural' that might be used, given major differences 
across existing government programmes (Right to Acquire, PRTB etc.)11. Decisions 
about rural housing exclusions in the pilot reflect settlement patterns and the extent 
to which properties can be replaced. Sovereign excluded 28 per cent of stock in the 
pilot using the ‘parish exemptions’ criteria of the Right to Acquire but Saffron and 
Thames Valley opted not to exclude any rural housing. In some cases VRTB was an 
opportunity to sell and replace isolated rural homes.  
The five associations are not planning to exclude additional properties in the full 
programme. The preference is for S106 properties to be included if possible. In the 
pilot areas S106 accounted for 50-60 per cent of the properties in the Saffron pilot 
area and around 30 per cent of homes in the Thames Valley pilot area. Riverside has 
no S106 properties in its pilot area, but has a significant proportion of exclusions 
because of legal covenants and conditions of lending.  
It is possible that planning agreements and other contractual conditions could be 
renegotiated with relevant organisations (local authorities, funders etc.), but that has 
not been tested in the pilot because S106 properties were automatically excluded. 
Associations in the pilot were not optimistic about the prospects for renegotiating 
S106 agreements. S106 agreements vary between local authority areas and often 
between properties within the same local authority area. Renegotiation of 
agreements will be time consuming and costly and the outcome will depend on the 
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 see Appendix 2  
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attitudes of local authorities. It is possible that some local authorities will see VRTB 
as an opportunity to support strategic housing objectives such as diversifying tenure. 
However it is also possible that many local authorities will defend S106 agreements 
and resist the loss of affordable housing, especially given recent national policies to 
relax affordable housing provision.  
This example of exclusions, and the variable response of the five pilots, reinforces 
the fact that the 'story' of VRTB will play out differently from one association to 
another. It also means that programme-wide aggregations of the response of the 
pilot associations are perhaps of less value than more detailed scrutiny of how 
specific associations responded to the challenge of processing VRTB applications, 
and what they learned from this. We return to this issue in Chapter 10.  
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Table 4.2: Exclusions in the pilot areas 
 L&Q Saffron Riverside Sovereign Thames Valley 
Properties in scope  18,667 
 
4,800 19,299 7,968 1,500 
Properties 
excluded from sale  
2,800 + supported housing 
(c.15-20%) 
3,200 
(67%) 
6,325 
(33%) 
4,302 
(54%) 
506 
(34%) 
Reasons for 
exclusion  
 Section 106  Note that supported 
housing was excluded but 
was never 'in-scope', i.e. 
no supported housing was 
included in the 18,667 
‘properties in scope’  
 Mainly Section 
106 some 
preserved RtB. 
 PRtB (3,081); housing for 
older people (1,989);  Restrictive conditions - not 
S106 (961);  Housing for disabled people 
(220);  Significant adaptations(40);  Tenanted houses due for 
disposal (34).  Note that supported housing 
was excluded but was never 
'in-scope', i.e. no supported 
housing was included in the 
19,299 ‘properties in scope’ 
 Rural housing using the 
‘parish exemptions’ 
criteria set out for the 
preserved RTB (28% of 
all stock);  Specialist housing for 
older people (12%);  LCHO/market rent 
status (10%);  Owned by Thames 
Valley (4%). 
 Mainly S106 with 
some existing 
PRtB.  Some sheltered 
housing 
exclusions  PFI homes 
excluded  Some restrictive 
conditions – not 
S106 
Exclusions, apart 
from S106, PRTB,  
property/lending 
conditions  
Minimal  
(less than 5% of properties in 
pilot) 
Minimal  
(less than 5% of 
properties in pilot) 
2283  
(12%) 
3,700  
(40%) 
Minimal  
(less than 5%) 
Planned changes 
in the full 
programme 
Inclusion of S106 where that 
is possible and jointly desired 
by L&Q and LA’s. 
Will need to look at rural 
exclusions (rural area not 
part of the pilot). 
Inclusion of S106 
where that is 
possible. 
Reduce exclusions for 
supported housing (if evidence 
that tenants could buy their own 
homes). 
Seek to renegotiate agreements 
on properties with restrictive 
conditions. 
Possibly revisit the blanket 
rural exclusion but unlikely. 
Possible inclusion of 
S106 where there is 
local authority 
agreement. 
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4.4. Stakeholder Views about the Operation of the Pilot Programme 
Stakeholders in all five associations were interviewed at various stages in the course 
of the programme.  Looking back, they all felt that involvement in the pilot was 
worthwhile and valuable.  The experience of working together was universally seen 
as positive and each association was now better prepared for the main scheme: 
Yeah absolutely, we’re really glad that we got involved.  We’ve had a very, very 
positive experience12  
The pilots were able to test the impact of the VRTB, enabling associations to develop 
management systems and processes, test estimates of future demand, and identify 
gaps in information and knowledge related to the eligibility of tenants and properties: 
All of the little wrinkles and nuances we could never had found out without the 
pilot. 
The most interesting aspect we keep coming back to […] is that we’ve kind of 
answered the questions that we had at the outset around affordability […] to be 
able to undertake a proper pilot and understand that has been fantastic. 
Certainly from my perspective, from the slightly more strategic perspective, 
absolutely glad [to have been involved].  I think we’ve learnt a huge amount, I 
think it’s put us in a really strong position to prepare for whatever is to come 
ahead.   
I think when we go to the conferences and meet our colleagues who are 
absolutely petrified of this voluntary right to buy coming, and I feel a certain 
calmness in the fact that we have already been through so many of the 
processes and experiences and we kind of understand what may come and 
what our potential issues would be when the scheme is rolled out.  We’ve been 
able to test admin, systems, been able to resource it in a way that we can 
determine what we might need going forward.  So I think it has been a good 
opportunity for us to take part, we have learnt loads and it’s nice to be the lead 
and have that expertise amongst our peers.  
Challenges   
While involvement in the pilot was considered worthwhile, it was a challenging 
process for all the associations because of the tight time schedule and the 
uncertainty about the progress of the Housing and Planning Bill, which had an impact 
on the timescale for sales.  There were difficulties in predicting demand and limited 
time to address challenging issues such as exclusions, gaps in information and data, 
and arrangements for valuation: 
                                               
12
 In the interest of maintaining confidentiality we have not disclosed which housing association the stakeholder 
quoted worked for. 
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The timescales were incredibly challenging … we had two months to get from 
announcement to inviting applications, [and] three months warning of the going 
live date. 
In general pilots had to undertake a lot of learning in a short period of time and that 
required considerable staff time and resources: 
In our experience the demand was higher than expected in terms of the data 
collection and the data checking, particularly if you’ve got fraud and fraud 
prevention, I think it’s quite onerous … and actually it does feel like it’s been a 
lot of hard work.   
However, the impact of additional workload varied across the pilots: 
I wouldn’t say it’s stretched the service, there’s been some pressures and 
reprioritisation for some parts of the business in terms of information but I don’t 
think it’s necessarily stretched in terms of costs when we did our cost calculation, 
we factored all the timing in and the same for that transactional fee, we were 
well within that.  
Section 106 properties were automatically excluded because of the limited timescale, 
but pilots had to make quick decisions about whether to exclude other properties and 
the pilot programme exposed cases of ‘hidden’ legal agreements and covenants that 
needed investigation and in some cases prevented sales. 
For example, we’ve got a whole estate in one area where there’s a restriction 
that it remains social housing forever, so the whole estate is exempt.  In 
advance we might have possibly known about that and been able to manage 
those expectations of those tenants as they came in instead of waiting until we 
got three, four, five of them checked and then realised there was an issue for 
the whole estate.  So that assets and liabilities register stuff which we didn’t put 
enough of a focus on at the beginning is possibly where I’m focusing more of my 
time going forward if we’re going to look at this wider for the rollout. 
In general some of the additional workload for the pilots was covered by the 
additional payment for set-up costs for involvement in the pilot and the fee paid on 
completion of each sale.  These costs will not be covered in this way under the main 
scheme. In addition, these payments did not cover the wider support costs, including 
investment in information systems, additional fraud protection and answering queries 
or providing support and reassurance for tenants: 
The point was made earlier about some of the more hidden costs probably 
across the wider organisation, I think that is probably where there is that 
significant knock on and when we’re not being paid, whether it’s [for] tenancy 
verification or getting asset management information for cost calculations. 
In some cases [tenants] find it a bit daunting or are not really sure and need 
reassurance. 
There was concern about the resource and administration costs for associations in 
the main scheme, including the need for specialist staff, and it was recognised that 
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the pilots had benefited from additional specialist input.  There was also concern that 
associations would have to invest in administrative support without ‘knowing the 
volumes they’re going to be dealing with’. 
The additional resources that have to be given to fraud protection indicate some of 
the more indirect costs of taking on VRTB for housing associations.  Clearly there is 
a risk of fraud, given the large discounts and property prices involved, especially in 
higher value areas.  The pilot associations have therefore had to audit their existing 
measures to combat fraud. All pilot associations had robust fraud prevention 
measures in place but L&Q set the lead here through the following range of checks 
and evidence requirements:    
 All applications have to be hand delivered, and applicants are subject to an 
interview to discuss their application.   All parties to the purchase must attend the interview and provide ID. 
documentation.  All tenants' signatures are compared to that on the tenancy agreement and 
any change of name requires proof of formal certificate such as marriage, 
divorce, deed poll etc.   Original identification documentation is required for all parties to the purchase. 
This includes photographic ID. All official documents are security checked 
with tools such UV lights for the correct holograms and markings.  Each party to the purchase to prove written evidence that they live at the 
property and have done so for at least 12 months, through council tax or 
voters role confirmation and supported by additional information such as utility 
bills, bank statements, doctors letter or mobile phone bill. Tenants were not 
able to 'evidence' length of tenancy by undertaking a statutory declaration.  There is a declaration on the application form allowing us to contact any 
parties in connection with assessing the application and confirming their right 
to buy.  If the applicant passes the interview stage, the documentation is passed over 
to a Tenancy Verification Team which undertakes checks with credit and data 
agencies.  Any discrepancies that arise prompt a home visit from housing officers to 
carry out tenancy audits or gather further information.   Anti-money laundering checks are carried out for cash purchases and 
declared savings are checked against any benefits being claimed. 
All these steps place additional demands on staff time and resources.  
Difficulties in managing tenant expectations were compounded in the first few 
months because the timescale for sales was unclear.  Associations were in a ‘race to 
get people through in the timescale’ but were also wary about raising tenant 
expectations whilst waiting for Housing and Planning Bill to go through Parliament.   
There was some tenant frustration with delays in the process, but it was also felt that 
tenants understood the need for patience. One stakeholder felt that associations 
would come under more pressure in the full programme if tenants became 
concerned about ‘losing their place' in the queue if there were any delays.    
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Officers from all pilot associations emphasised the need for as much certainty as 
possible when the main scheme is introduced.13  Associations will face considerable 
challenges in anticipating demand, managing tenant expectations, dealing with 
complications in the sales process and simply managing the programme.  Any 
uncertainty around funding for sales would make it much more difficult for individual 
associations to manage the impact of the main scheme. 
Relations between the pilots 
The sharing of knowledge and expertise across the pilots was felt to be particularly 
valuable, reflecting a strong shared commitment to joint working.  From the outset 
the relationship between the five pilots was ‘constructive and collaborative’: 
Even though we’ve been very collegiate, that’s not to say we haven’t challenged 
each other. I can think of various things where we’ve had long and challenging 
discussions … I think we almost adopted a cabinet collective responsibility 
approach, that’s we’ve got to think we’re all behind this and this is what we run 
for the pilot, even though the discussion people may have raised various queries 
or misgivings about things.  
There’s not a single decision that has stymied us as a group that we’ve been 
unable to follow through because it’s just too difficult, and the more people you 
have in a room the more challenging that becomes … we appointed a single set 
of solicitors, we’ve got a set of documents we all signed off, a property and 
individual eligibility grid that we all signed off and an application form that we all 
signed off, that is a really hard thing to do.  
..overall the five seemed like a really good, tight knit bit of a teamwork, divvied 
up the jobs without anybody really taking a back seat or putting their feet up. 
The experience with our peers was a very positive one … it did seem to be a 
genuinely collaborative endeavour which is certainly not always the case.  
For example, there was considerable discussion about exclusions ‘because it 
impacted on people in different ways, but also that people had different organisation 
views’ but it was possible to develop ‘a framework everybody could live with’.  There 
was a widespread feeling that all associations ‘pulled their weight’ in order to make 
the pilot programme work and that had involved considerable contribution to the 
management of the pilots over and above the processing of tenant interest and sales. 
Joint working was helped because ‘there was a lack of ego in the group’ and ‘we 
weren’t trying to outdo each other’.   There were ‘ambivalent feelings about whether 
we wanted to be the poster boys or girls for voluntary right to buy … none of us 
wanted to be perceived as the champion that’s selling social housing assets’. It was 
also important that ‘Chief Executives were on board and driving it and they knew 
each other’.   
                                               
13
 Many of the detailed arrangements for the main VRTB programme were not known at the time of these 
stakeholder interviews. 
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The mix of pilot areas  
Inevitably the five pilot areas could not cover the full geographical diversity of 
England.  The main gaps were felt to be the South West and Midlands: 
You’ve got the Sovereign markets, the low value northern ones, I think maybe 
there is a miss of markets in between. 
Perhaps something in the North East or the Midlands would have been sensible. 
In terms of spread and variation I’d say yes, all you might have gone for is 
maybe gone into the far north, Carlisle or Newcastle or somewhere like that […]  
The other thing is maybe we could have also included somebody from the South 
West because that’s a different market with the holiday homes and that’s an 
interesting market as well.  
However, it was generally felt that the pilots represented a good sample of local 
market contexts and circumstances that might impact on the full programme, 
including a mix of areas in London, areas with a lot of Section 106 properties, 
specialist housing and rural property: 
It has enabled us from that to test a lot of different housing markets and demand 
for it.    
The key thing was to contrast the centre of London with other centres and with 
Sovereign, Riverside and Saffron in the picture I think we got a good spread.  
The main problem about any attempt to increase the diversity of local housing 
markets to be included in the programme was that stakeholders felt that a larger 
number of associations would have been difficult to manage and have potentially 
undermined the coherence of the programme: 
I think it we’d had more people round the table in those piloteers meetings we 
would have quickly got to the stage where it was unmanageable and as it was, 
at the beginning, before we got involved, it was a lot thrashing around in the first 
meetings … I think more of us would have made it more difficult.  
 I think there’s challenge about whether you can deliver a pilot realistically with 
more than five organisations. 
Governance of the pilot programme 
All of the pilots were positive about the role of all partners in the pilot programme and 
the relative operational freedom given to the pilot associations. There was a feeling 
that the pilot 'belonged to' the associations and that was important in managing 
relationships with central government: 
I think early days there was a little bit of a ownership tussle went on between us, 
that very soon went away and they’ve been really supportive […] I can’t fault the 
support we’ve had to be honest.  When we said we thought we needed to be 
better represented on the Sounding Board we were.  So generally speaking I’ve 
got no complaints. 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 28 
I think the National Housing Federation have been in a really tricky position so I 
think they’ve been really excellent to work with.  I just think the problems we 
have had are just a product of the way the government made these decisions in 
the first place. So in other words the decision to not link the pilot to the main 
scheme, decisions about timescale blah, blah, but no criticisms of Nat Fed at all, 
I think they’ve behaved really well and they’ve hosted really well, they’ve been 
very flexible.   
With hindsight the pilots would have established closer links between the Operational 
Working Group and the Marketing and Communications Working Group.  These 
groups were perhaps driven by different objectives: the operational discussions were 
often driven by shared and more immediate problems and concerns, and that could 
have been shared more within the communications team:   
..if we could do this again I think right from the get go we should have a much 
stronger link with the Comms, so someone from Comms should come to those 
Ops meeting and someone from the Ops group should go to the Comms 
meetings.  We connected up ok but not perfect and I think there were certain 
points where you could see where that juddered a little bit more than it maybe 
would have done if we’d made the connection at the start. 
There was frustration with the limited opportunity for pilots to engage with the 
Sounding Board for the main scheme.  The initial timetable for policy development 
and the determination of the national scheme was coterminous with the development 
of the pilot programme, which meant that there was less scope to communicate and 
digest lessons from the pilots in order to inform fully the national scheme:  
If we have the luxury of a bit more time to plan this, we would have kind of set 
out the policy development for the main scheme in a way where the timetable 
could be met by the outcomes for the pilot, but we didn’t have that option 
available.  
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The Sounding Board initially should have made a much stronger link to what the 
pilot was doing. I think that was a timetable issue, but I think they were separate 
because they were trying to set the scheme up as quickly as possible, the pilot 
was seen as being on a different track.   I think the key thing for this exercise, in 
future I think you should make a pilot link very firmly to the main scheme 
Sounding Board and the staff groups for the Sounding Board as well. 
Overall the process of planning for the main programme was felt to be disconnected 
from the experience of the pilots, especially in the earlier stages of the pilot, and 
stakeholders felt they had to ‘work hard' to be represented in Sounding Board 
discussions, which did not make sufficient use of the knowledge and expertise that 
had been garnered during the first few months of the pilot scheme. Stakeholders did 
report, however, that the interaction between the pilot programme and the Sounding 
Board improved over time. The Sounding Board agreed, for example, for an 
additional representative from the pilots to sit on the group. A particular issue of 
contention was whether a 'portal' approach to applications was to be used in the 
national scheme whereby applications were made and then funding provided as and 
when it became available, rather than a 'programme' approach to a specified level of 
activity.  Stakeholders from the pilot associations felt that a portal approach would 
make it much more difficult for associations to manage tenant expectations and plan 
for future sales: 
But there’ll be an incentive to us to drive costs down of admin, which loops back 
to…debates with DCLG about what the overall approach will be for the final 
scheme.  The more certainty we’ve got which means we can plan, which is why 
we favour this programme approach, the more cost-efficient the admin will be.  
But if every housing association starts off not having a blind clue [about demand] 
it’s going to be so difficult, particularly for small organisations. 
The overriding feeling from those involved in the pilot is that they had worked well 
together in the spirit of providing meaningful insights into key aspects of VRTB in 
different geographical and housing market contexts.  That reflected a shared 
commitment to testing the scheme and drawing out lessons for the main programme.  
In the following chapter, we compare these views about the operation of the pilot 
scheme with tenants' views and experiences of the application process. 
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5 5. Tenant Experiences of the 
VRTB Process 
In Chapter 3 we described the process through which tenants expressed an interest 
in the VRTB, proceeded to an application and then to completion. In this chapter we 
consider tenants' experiences of this process, including their views of the Expression 
of Interest (EOI) and application forms, the provision of information, and 
communication with their landlord. Very few tenants had proceeded beyond valuation 
at the time the interviews were undertaken, so it is not possible to offer much insight, 
at this point, into the final stages of the process. Further interviews will be conducted 
with tenants who have completed their purchase and their experiences will be 
detailed in a subsequent research report.  
5.1. Tenant experiences of administrative processes 
In general, tenants spoke very positively about the administrative processes involved 
in the pilot programme.  Some glitches were reported - the odd application form 
going astray or website crashing - but the overall message was that the EOI online 
form (on the DCLG portal) and application forms were well-designed, easy to 
complete, and that bureaucratic requirements (for example, for certain 
documentation or information) were relatively easy to meet for most applicants.14 
Tenants were required, as part of the application process, to provide proof of 10+ 
years of social housing tenancies as well as proof of income, information about their 
employment and other household members. No interview respondent reported 
significant problems completing the forms or providing the necessary information and 
none intimated that the process was onerous. Pilot landlords did report that some 
applicants struggled to prove tenancy eligibility, particularly where they had 
previously been tenants of a local authority housing department whose stock had 
subsequently been transferred. This did not, however, appear to be a widespread 
problem.  
                                               
14
 The research team identified a number of improvements that could be made to the application forms but from a 
data collection and analysis perspective rather than a user perspective.  
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Figure 5.1 shows that only a small proportion (seven per cent) of online survey 
respondents who had applied for the VRTB found the application form 'fairly' or 'very' 
difficult to complete while 16 per cent found that 'getting all the necessary paperwork 
together' was 'fairly' or 'very' difficult. It is worth noting that the pilot landlords offered 
very little, if any, help and support to tenants with this part of the process. They 
answered queries but were clear that their role did not include assisting tenants to 
complete EOI or application forms, prove length of tenancy, or secure relevant 
documentation. It was part of the process of treating applicants like anyone else who 
was seeking to purchase a property in the private market. The majority (71 per cent) 
of online survey applicants reported not receiving any help with their application 
forms and, from discussion with interview respondents, few appeared to need it. The 
following comments are illustrative of the views of most of the tenants interviewed 
about the bureaucratic process. 
I was a bit nervous about the form, cos it's buying a house, what are they going 
to want? But it was so easy, I couldn't believe how straight forward it was (Helen) 
I think the process has been really good. I've found it really good, really simple, 
everybody I've spoken to has been really able to explain…yeah, everybody's 
been really informative, the application form was easy to fill out, the leaflets that 
came, everything's been quite informative, I haven't had a problem (Annabel)  
No notable differences emerged between the experiences of tenants of the one pilot 
landlord providing a full digital application service and those relying on paper 
application forms.  
Figure 5.1: Perceptions of application process, online tenant survey15 
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5.2. Tenant views and experiences of marketing and communication 
Pilot landlord marketing of the VRTB, mainly in the form of leaflets and letters, 
certainly reached tenants - those interviewed reported receiving a letter and most 
could recall the content16 - but many (36 per cent of online survey respondents) had 
already noted the introduction of VRTB from national media (see Figure 5.2). Some 
tenants, in fact, had been eagerly awaiting the time when the RTB would be 
extended to housing associations and had approached their landlord previously to 
enquire about purchasing their homes  
Figure 5.2: How did you first hear about the right to buy? (online tenant survey) 
 
 
Tenants were generally positive about the information and communication they 
received about the VRTB. For example, no interview respondent and few survey 
respondents had found written information (leaflets, letters from landlords, websites) 
difficult to comprehend. Figure 5.3 shows that the majority of survey respondents 
who had received written information (88 per cent) found it 'very easy' or 'fairly easy' 
to understand.17 In fact, some interview respondents - like Annabel quoted in Section 
5.1 above - emphasised how informative written material had been and how easy it 
was to understand. Others agreed: 
When I got the information pack it was all there. It was all pretty clear and 
straight forward. (Phil) 
When questioned, tenants did seem reasonably well-informed. For example many 
(particularly those who had made a full application) knew about, and could explain, 
                                               
16
 Tenants participating in the research, via the survey or interviews, had all expressed an interest in the right to 
buy and so we would expect to find relatively high levels of general awareness of initial marketing.  
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restrictions on resale and subletting, the eligibility criteria, and the discount cap. The 
majority of survey respondents (84 per cent) reported being aware of restrictions on 
resale. This suggests that the pilot communication strategy was effective, particularly 
in the context of having to convey sometimes rather technical (and perhaps less than 
interesting) information. Again, no notable differences emerged between tenants of 
different pilot landlords and some information (for example, that on the DCLG 
website through which tenants expressed an interest) was the same across the pilot 
programme.  
Satisfaction was slightly lower, and experiences more varied, with regard to verbal 
communication, although the majority of respondents (survey and interview) did 
report positive experiences and informative communication. Thus, 80 per cent of 
tenants who received verbal information said it was 'very' or 'fairly' easy to 
understand (see Figure 5.3).  
This does leave an important minority who found verbal information more difficult to 
comprehend. Drawing on the experiences of interview respondents, we suggest this 
may reflect experiences of thwarted attempts to reach a relevant or knowledgeable 
staff member, or difficulties in accessing information promptly rather than the quality 
or clarity of the verbal information eventually received. No interview respondent 
reported difficulties comprehending verbal information from landlords, or confusion 
about their response to a query. However, some did express frustration at not having 
ready access to information, contrasting starkly with the experiences of those whose 
queries were immediately dealt with by an informed member of staff. Helen and 
Jeremy's contrasting comments illustrate this point well:  
When you phone up they've got a dedicated right-to-buy team which was so 
reassuring…you speak to someone straight away, that was so reassuring, and 
you could tell it was all up to date cos they'd say 'what is your name' and bring 
up our details and give me an update there and then…it sounded like they were 
really well organised. (Helen) 
I don’t think the team are that informed cos every time I rang them up they 
always had to consult somebody else. (Jeremy) 
One respondent pointed out that, with only 20 days in which to accept an offer 
(during which time tenants may need to secure a mortgage and instruct a solicitor), it 
can be imperative that queries are dealt with promptly. Her only complaint about the 
process - which she otherwise spoke of in glowing terms - was the apparent absence 
of a full time member of staff to deal with enquiries:  
If you're unsure of something and you think 'I'll double check' something and 
they've given you a certain amount of time as well to get that form back, and 
then you're told 'she's not back til Monday' and it's Thursday and that's four days 
that I haven't got to be able to sort it out. (Angela).  
In addition, a relatively high proportion of survey respondents (39 per cent) reported 
not having all the information they needed to make a decision about applying for the 
right to buy. This is very likely to reflect the fact that at the point of applying most 
tenants did not know the value of their home (valuations were done later in the 
process and only one pilot offered indicative valuations to potential applicants) or 
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their mortgage eligibility. Tenants were advised against making formal mortgage 
applications prior to a formal offer notice being served to avoid incurring unnecessary 
expenses (for example, if their home was subsequently found to be excluded) or 
having mortgage offers expire. This is an issue we reflect further on below (see 
Section 5.3), and again in Chapter 8.  
Figure 5.3: Perceptions of information provided, online tenant survey18 
 
5.3. Issues raised about the process 
Although the EOI and application process did not, generally, present any significant 
challenges for tenants, qualitative interviews revealed that certain aspects of the 
process had prompted a degree of dissatisfaction, disappointment, or anxiety. In 
particular, issues emerged with regard to: the requirement to make a full application 
and pay an administration fee before receiving a valuation; the process for identifying 
'exempt' properties; and the impact on tenants of the process being 'suspended', or 
delayed.  
Application and fee before valuation  
Tenants wishing to exercise the RTB in the pilots had to submit an application and 
pay a £250 administration fee. The pilot housing associations then conducted the 
necessary legal searches and investigations to ensure the property could be sold 
and, once this was established, proceeded to value the property. The £250 
administration fee is refunded if it transpires that the applicant's property is excluded 
or once the tenant has purchased the property, but it is not refunded if the tenant 
withdraws from the process (for example, if the property proves unaffordable).  
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Tenants in the pilot therefore applied to buy their homes, and paid their fee without 
knowing the value or purchase price of their home. Tenants were encouraged by the 
pilot associations to research property prices in their neighbourhood to help them 
assess the viability of buying. However, tenants interviewed explained that this was 
not always possible, for example if there had been few recent sales nearby, or no 
equivalent properties sold (see Chapter 9 for further discussion of this). The process 
replicates that of the statutory RTB with the exception of the administration fee, 
which is not payable under the statutory scheme.  
One of the pilot landlords provided an indicative valuation to tenants earlier in the 
process to help them make an informed decision about whether to apply. Most of the 
participating landlords, however, were reluctant to do so, concerned about the 
ramifications of unwittingly raising expectations with low indicative valuations. A 
relatively small disparity between an indicative and a formal valuation can represent 
the difference between an affordable and an unaffordable purchase. We will see that 
some tenants were operating at the very limit of what they could afford but were very 
eager to take advantage of the 'once in a lifetime' opportunity to meet their 
aspirations (Chapter 8). Pilot landlords were sensitive to this fact, and concerned 
about having to manage the consequences of tenants whose hopes they may have 
raised, and then dashed.  
But not all tenants appreciated this, and some found it difficult to comprehend that 
they could be asked to pay a fee and apply to buy something without knowing the 
price. They pointed out that this does not replicate a normal purchase:  
If I was to go to buy a house I’d ask how much it was and they’d tell me for 
free…if I went to estate agents they’d tell me how much the property was I’m 
going to buy. (Leslie).  
I felt like 'do I really want to waste this money?', cos what they said was they 
wanted me to pay for it before I had a chance to see whether it was actually 
financially viable…I said how can you try and offer to sell me something when 
you're not telling me how much it is? If you go and buy a car they don't tell you 
you have to wait two weeks before they tell you the price. It just doesn't work like 
that….All I got back from them was 'you have to decide whether it's a risk 
enough' I said 'well, I could go and put my rent money on the lottery and that 
would be a risk, you need to give me a bit more than that." (Maggs) 
You need to ensure you could get a mortgage, but you don’t know whether 
you’re going to be able to get a mortgage until you get the valuation, you can’t 
get the valuation until you’ve paid £250, so then they say if you apply, you pay 
your money and for whatever reason you can’t proceed, you lose your money.  
But it’s not your fault cos you don’t know what the valuation is, so you don’t 
know whether you can get the mortgage or not. (Olubunmi) 
It is worth noting that other tenants thought it perfectly reasonable to be required to 
pay an administration fee upfront.  
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Suspending the process 
Two unexpected issues arose during the pilot that effectively suspended the RTB 
process for some tenants. First, L&Q were inundated by EOIs and applications in the 
early stages of the pilot and, concerned about being oversubscribed and having to 
disappoint tenants, they stopped accepting any new applications for a period of time. 
Thus, some L&Q tenants were not able to proceed beyond an EOI19, or had to wait 
until the next tranche of applications were accepted. Second, the Housing and 
Planning Bill took longer than anticipated to pass through Parliament. Pilot landlords 
could not proceed with any sales until the Act was passed and until they had that 
certainty they did not think it prudent to commit resources to valuations and searches 
or raise tenant expectations. They wanted to avoid at all costs tenants reaching the 
brink of completion and not being able to proceed.  
The impact of a process that stalled was keenly felt by tenants, who expressed 
frustration, anxiety and, at times, suspicion. From their perspective they had 
completed the necessary forms, submitted paperwork in some cases, and were keen 
to progress steadily through the process. Instead, progress came to a halt with no 
assurance of when they would move forward again.  
They've taken my money very quickly…and I've heard nothing since…I keep 
calling the person he's dealing with it [who] says 'I'm sorry I don't know, I can't 
tell you, we don't know at this stage'…it was basically saying they they're in 
limbo, until someone else makes a decision they can't go further with it. (Mags) 
To be honest I'm a bit fed up coz I received some details a long time ago and I 
haven’t heard anything from them since and, when I phoned them up to see 
what was happening, they said the legislation hadn't passed yet. (Rick) 
The vast majority of tenants reported that VRTB represented their only opportunity 
for home ownership (see Chapter 6) and, in this context, feelings (and anxieties) 
could run high. Delays, therefore, can quickly prompt anxiety and frustration amongst 
tenants (something the landlords may then need to manage and respond to). Doreen, 
for example, reported feeling 'anxious' 'just in case the Government said no…' Tanya 
reported similar concerns explaining that the 'only thing during that process that I 
didn't like, there was a long wait [while the] government passed the legislation…At 
one stage I was like 'oh my god, what if it doesn't happen… it's that waiting game, 
checking emails every day.' Angela, similarly, talked about the delay in the context of 
her 'excitement' about buying her home: 
We were told in April it would be June and June came and went….you're all 
excited about it, this started around Christmas time and now you're in August 
and you're thinking really? Does it take this long?...It would have been better to 
get it through Parliament first." (Angela) 
Even reasonable timescales felt like delays to some tenants, whose views of the 
process and the landlord were then quickly coloured by their experience. One 
                                               
19 Some tenants were subsequently able to apply. Once L&Q were confident they could accept further 
applications without exceeding their quota they opened the scheme again and accepted further tranches of 
applications.  
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respondent, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the landlord, explaining that 
they had 'forgotten about her' (they almost certainly had not, still being well within the 
timescale for that part of the process). Another expressed dissatisfaction with 
landlord communication because he has expressed an interest nearly two weeks ago 
and had not yet received an application form - again, in an acceptable timeframe.  
In the regional pilot and then the main scheme, there will be no such hiatus while 
legislation passes through Parliament. However, any rationing mechanisms 
employed - for example quotas, or pausing until the next tranche of funding is 
available from the sale of high value council homes - could have the same effect. 
Process for identifying excluded properties 
Certain types of property were excluded from the pilot VRTB, including housing for 
older people, supported housing and housing for disabled people (as defined by the 
housing association concerned).  Properties were also excluded where Section 106 
or other planning agreements restricted the use of the property (e.g. to affordable 
housing). The reason for excluding such properties was partly pragmatic as it would 
not be possible to secure the consent of the local authorities to varying Section 106 
conditions within the timetable of the pilot programme.  In addition, the associations 
took a fairly consistent approach to using their discretion not to sell properties: based 
on an existing list of excluded rural parishes for Right to Acquire (RTA) purposes, or 
a special list drawn up by the association; and for reasons such as asset 
management and redevelopment (for example, due to impending demolition, 
regeneration, change of use or disposal).  This flexibility was allowed because 
including such properties might increase costs and delays on existing developments 
or require programmes to be revised.  
However, some properties cannot be sold for reasons that do not come to light until 
legal searches and investigations have been done. We reported in Chapter 4 on 
stakeholder concerns about the complexities of identifying these properties, for 
example those with planning restrictions or other covenants that prevent sale, and of 
accessing up to date and reliable S106 data.  
As a result, there were instances in the pilot programme of tenants progressing some 
way through the process before their landlord ascertained that the property was 
excluded. By this time, tenants felt confident they could purchase and were excited 
about owning their own home, in some cases after years of aspiring to do so. Tanya 
was one such tenant, describing being 'over the moon' when the VRTB was 
announced, having spent years exploring ways of buying a home (shared ownership 
schemes, open market, regular enquiries to her landlord). Her mortgage had been 
approved, all finance was in place (and with her solicitor), and a completion date was 
set. She then received a letter explaining that her property could not, in fact, be sold 
at this time, as it was likely that there was a covenant on the property. She explained 
that 'apparently there is a charge on the property, and so that's been going on for 
about six weeks now and I'm absolutely livid….apparently something to do with a 
charity'. The landlord is attempting to negotiate in order to release the property for 
sale but in the meantime Tanya has no idea whether she will be able to complete her 
purchase.  
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Detrimental emotional impact on tenants was not the only consequence of unclear 
(to tenants) exclusion criteria and processes. A change in, or lack of clarity about, 
exclusions was also found to affect tenants' attitudes towards their landlord. To Billy, 
for example, a change of 'eligibility status' appeared as incompetence on the part of 
his landlord. He 'passed' the basic eligibility checks and assumed these were fixed 
but, on closer investigation, it transpired his property was exempt. Not fully 
understanding the process, Billy assumed his landlord had made a mistake initially. 
Others expressed similar sentiments when exclusion criteria were not clear. Adrian, 
for example, whose property was excluded, made the following comment: 
I asked them if they could give me clarification on what's classed as rural, but 
they couldn't. You could class anything as rural if there's a field nearby. (Adrian) 
Pilot landlords fully appreciated the impact of exclusion policies that were unclear to 
tenants, acknowledging that these may appear inconsistent with consequences for 
their relationship with the landlord. One landlord, for example, expressed the view 
that tenants are familiar with, and can more easily comprehend certain classifications 
of exclusions (adapted properties, supported housing and suchlike). Those where 
covenants prevent sales (for example, related to gifted and or scheme funding 
restrictions) are less readily understood. He expressed concern about how tenants 
will react if their property is excluded because of, as he put it and they may see it, 'an 
accident of history' while an identical property nearby can be bought. This situation 
may be compounded in the national scheme, as there will be overlapping 
geographical coverage between different landlords who may be operating different 
exclusion practices. There was no such overlap in the pilot programme 
Judging by their comments in interview, tenants do not react well in these situations. 
Rather, any lack of clarity, (apparent) inconsistency, or late in the day exclusion can 
breed suspicion and rumour about the true motivation of the landlord (and 
government), which is not conducive to positive tenant/landlord relations. Amongst 
our interview respondents this included views such as: 
 Landlords do not want to sell high value stock: two respondents expressed the 
view that rural exclusions were a smokescreen for protecting higher value stock.   Landlords want to dispose of older properties. Talking about why his home was 
excluded, Billy for example talked in terms of the 'excuses' made by his landlord: 
They did the excuse of the building was built after 1989… I didn’t even believe it 
to be honest…my building was built I think in 1989 and there’s some cut off 
point that if buildings are built after a certain period they’re not, this was the 
reason I was told, I don’t know whether that’s true, so it’s whether they want to 
sell all the old properties…(Billy)  Landlords want to retain older properties - 'it's quite an old house. It think if it 
was a new-build they'd have given it to me' (Sarah-Jane)  The VRTB will sway voters, generate funds for central government, or I think 
they’re doing it for that to get the benefit budget down. (Richard) 
Lessons can be learnt from the issues raised in this section for the regional pilot and 
the national roll-out. There are some key messages about communication, and about 
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timing, and of managing the expectations and anxieties of tenants on the brink of a 
major life decision. 
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6 6. Why do tenants want to buy 
their home? 
There is strong evidence that the VRTB pilot programme provided tenants with an 
opportunity to fulfil aspirations for home ownership. There was very little evidence, 
meanwhile, of investment driven purchasing, although tenants did recognise the 
financial benefits that could accrue to them through ownership, particularly when 
purchasing with a large discount.  
Many of the tenants interviewed had long-held aspirations to own their own home 
and reported being 'delighted' when they heard the RTB was being extended to 
housing association tenants. For example: 
I've always wanted to buy a home20 (Sarah-Jane) 
I've always thought of owning my own property and the opportunity's come up 
and I want to take advantage of it (Paul) 
When they came in with this new legislation that they would allow the sale of a 
property, I was over the moon (Alice) 
Several had been so keen to buy their home they had contacted their landlord on 
numerous occasions over the years to query whether they could purchase. Others 
had explored shared ownership options (to no avail) or had been seeking transfers to 
council property where they would be able to exercise the statutory right to buy.21 
Respondents described immediately contacting their landlords upon hearing news of 
the VRTB on national media, and logging their EOI on the first day of the scheme to 
secure their place in the queue.  
In addition, most respondents were clear that the VRTB provided their only 
opportunity to buy. It represented a chance to realise their aspirations in an 
otherwise unaffordable housing market:  
                                               
20
 All interview respondents were asked why they had expressed an interest in the RTB but not all had applied to 
do so. The tenants quoted in this section all indicated that they would like to buy their homes but not all were able 
to proceed to an application (several were in excluded properties, for example), or had not progressed that far at 
the time of their interview. 
21
 It is of interest that some pilots received EOIs from tenants who already had the right to buy through the 
'preserved right to buy'. These tenants are not eligible for the VRTB on the grounds of eligibility for PRTB. These 
tenants had always had the right to buy their home yet had not applied to do so until the VRTB pilot programme 
was introduced. It is possible that some of these tenants did not realise they already had the right to buy.  
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The way current prices are there’s no way in the world a nurse is going to be 
able to afford even a bed-sit in a grotty area anywhere in the country given 
salaries and the cuts and prices going up. (Richard) 
We did previously [look on the open market] quite a few years ago and without 
the discount we would never have been able to afford something like we've got 
now (Angela) 
I would never have been able to own my own home otherwise (Annabel) 
Interview respondents reported not being able to afford open market prices, secure 
the requisite mortgage or save a large enough deposit, while only 16 per cent of 
survey respondents said they would have looked on the open market if the VRTB 
had not been introduced (See Figure 6.1). Interestingly, there was very little variation 
in survey responses between the two pilot HAs with the highest and lowest property 
values (L&Q and Riverside). 
Of course not all tenants had actually tested the market and so their conclusions 
about market affordability may not have been fully informed. We will see in Chapter 8, 
for example, that awareness of property values and mortgage eligibility was not high. 
Just as some tenants assumed erroneously that they would be able to afford to 
purchase through the VRTB, others may have erroneously assumed they could not 
afford to buy on the open market. Nevertheless, nearly all of those interviewed - 
some of whom had explored their options more fully - were firmly of the view that the 
VRTB gave them their only change of owning their own home. And information about 
applicants' income and savings (presented in Chapter 8) suggests this may well be 
the case for many of them.  
At the heart of many tenants' aspirations to own their home was the desire to provide 
a legacy for children, and 'security' for themselves and their families. All interview 
respondents who had children referred to them when responding to questions about 
their motivation to buy. For example: 
It's more the fact that once your children start getting a bit older and you realise 
you've got nothing to leave them (Maggs) 
Well, it's going to give me something to pass on to my children, that was the 
main thing of it (Phil) 
Security, and something for my son in the future 
Respondents' reference to 'security' as a motivating factor in their desire to buy was 
often a little nebulous. However, it was clear that respondents were rarely referring to 
financial 'security', describing instead a kind of psychological, or ontological, security. 
I know you've got security with the council place but it's still the fact [if it is 
owned that] it's your home and you can do what you want to it (Angela) 
I wanted to have some security, some sort of feeling of security, cos I've got 
children, for myself and my children…I think the end game of owning your own 
property meant getting a good education, going to university, trying to get a 
decent job, saving money so it's all linked to that kind of thing, and then you 
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have something to pass on to your children so it's all linked in my mind to that 
kind of striving towards something. Whereas when you're renting you don't get 
that same sort of feeling of progress(Annabel) 
In contrast, there was very little evidence of investment purchasing, i.e. purchasing 
with a view to selling in five years to realise the equity (discount). Only two per cent 
of survey respondents said their main motivation to buy was to generate a nest egg 
for the future by selling in a few years (see Figure 5.2). Rather, respondents 
(generally, though not always) described homes they loved, and expressed strong 
commitment to their communities and neighbourhoods. The VRTB was an 
opportunity to invest further in a 'lifetime home'. 
No [I wouldn't sell in five years]. I’ll come out of here in a wooden box, we love it 
here. 
That tells you the story of why I want to buy it…It’s the only home I’ve ever had 
in my life…that’s it, sentimental value rather than monetary value (Jeremy) 
I love it. I've got field views out the front and the neighbours are fantastic and it's 
really quiet and it's absolutely lovely…if it had been my previous home I 
probably wouldn't have bothered…my husband and I are really happy here, so it 
is somewhere we want to be long-term (Angela) 
My interest in buying a property is coz we're going to be here forever (Ruth) 
I've grown attached to the area and the community here. There are people I 
know, it's not just bricks and mortar. If I was to buy this place, it's all the links 
with the community … (Connor) 
In this context, conditions of resale were of little consequence to those interviewed. 
Few had any intention of selling in the foreseeable future.  A key concern with the 
VRTB - drawing from the experience of the statutory RTB - is that the stock will 
remain only briefly with the original purchaser, quickly transferring into the private 
rental market. The conditions of resale are an attempt to mitigate this eventuality. 
The stated intentions of tenants in the pilot suggest these concerns may be 
unwarranted. However, we are dealing only in intentions at this stage in the process, 
and intentions do not always translate into actions.  
Although there was little evidence of investment-driven purchasing, financial 
considerations did feature in respondents' decision making and some had 
considered the opportunities that could flow from a sale later in life. Some, for 
example, had calculated that their mortgage payments were no more than their rent, 
or believed it financially prudent to invest in property through mortgage payments 
rather than paying rent. As the following quotes show, however, financial 
considerations typically sat alongside other motivations, such as generating a family 
asset: 
It would be nice to own something. I've been paying the money all this time so I 
should be able to own it… (Sarah-Jane) 
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The motivation is to leave something for my daughter and also I’m paying quite 
a bit for the rent. So instead of paying the rent it will be better for me to pay a 
mortgage and I don’t really want to move from this flat. I think this is home for 
life now. (Sienna) 
I thought to myself it’s [savings] sitting there doing nothing, instead of me paying 
rent, if I could get this property cheaper and put a big deposit on it… but also 
when I leave work I’ll get a lump sum with my pension and I could put that in and 
then I’m not having to pay rent.  It was like a savings thing in a way, so that 
when I die the property can be sold and shared between my children. (Leslie) 
Some interview respondents also appreciated that they would be investing in an 
asset that they could draw on in the future by releasing equity. The 'value' in the 
property could help respondents fulfil retirement dreams, and provide opportunities 
for mobility, and flexibility in future housing decisions. When respondents talked 
about selling in the future, emphasis was nearly always placed firmly on realising life 
plans and aspirations, rather than realising equity (although the former was clearly 
reliant on the latter). Thus, one respondent talked about the possibility of emigrating 
to Australia to join her adult children, while another talked about retiring abroad. 
Martin, meanwhile, explained that 'If I owned a property then I can sell it and move 
back down to my mum or somewhere else.' Phil's comment below also demonstrates 
that the VRTB increased respondents' choices about future life plans.   
Well, it's going to give me something to pass on to my children, that was the 
main thing of it, I wanted a place for my three children in the future. I've got a lot 
of love for Portugal…I hope that one day…I'll be able to retire there if I get some 
kind of equity in the property…I could either rent this place out, or sell it, or even 
pass it on to the kids. (Phil) 
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Figure 6.1: If the RTB had not been introduced do you think you would have…? 
(online tenant survey, N = 597) 
 
 
Figure 6.2: What is the MAIN reason you want to buy your home (online tenant 
survey, N = 597) 
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7 7. What was the level of 
demand for VRTB in the pilot 
programme? 
In Chapter 3 we reported on progress across the pilot programme, including 
information about the number of tenants expressing an interest in, and applying for, 
VRTB. In this chapter we interrogate these figures to draw conclusions about the 
level of interest in VRTB across the pilot housing associations.  
Prior to the pilot programme, a range of estimates had been made about the likely 
demand for the VRTB. These varied from around 10 per cent to 35 per cent of 
tenants, depending on the assumptions underpinning the estimates. In a review last 
year for the Communities and Local Government Committee we presented evidence 
to suggest that demand was likely to be at the lower end of this range (Cole et al, 
2015). However, most of these estimates had assumed that tenants who had been 
living in their property for three years would be eligible for the Right to Buy. As we 
have seen, tenants were only eligible for VRTB in the pilots if they had been a social 
tenant (not necessarily with the same landlord) for at least ten years. This reduced 
eligibility considerably. A large survey of social housing tenants provided a more 
detailed understanding of their perceptions of the Right to Buy (Green et al, 2016). 
Seven per cent of tenants responding said they were likely to take up the RTB and 
were assessed as being able to afford their property. However, there was major 
regional variation, ranging from one per cent of tenants in London to 12 per cent in 
the Midlands and the North. Clearly these were fairly speculative indications of the 
likely take-up once the national programme is introduced. 
7.1. Expressions of interest and applications in the pilot programme 
As reported in Chapter 4, a total of 4,405 tenants expressed an interest in the VRTB 
across the five pilots, with the highest number of Expressions of Interest (EOIs) 
submitted in L&Q (1,894) and Riverside (1,700).  By 3 November 2016 the pilot 
landlords had processed 972 applications from these 4,405 initial EOIs.  
These figures alone tell us very little, however, about the level of demand for the 
VRTB. Each pilot scheme differed in size - from 21,000 properties in Riverside to just 
1,500 in Thames Valley - and approaches to marketing also varied. One landlord, for 
example, invited all tenants in the pilot to express an interest, while another 
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targeted just those tenants known to meet the 10 year minimum tenancy eligibility 
criterion. 
Calculating EOIs and applications as a proportion of households in the pilot and, 
specifically, of tenants in eligible properties provides a more useful indication of initial 
demand for the VRTB.  This analysis (Table 7.1) shows:  
 8.2 per cent of the total number of households in the pilot programme expressed 
an interest in the VRTB. This varied from 2.4 per cent in Saffron to 10.1 percent 
in L&Q.   26.9 per cent of households living in eligible properties22 expressed an interest 
in the VRTB.  This varied from 7.2 per cent in Saffron to 34.6 per cent in 
Sovereign.  1.8 per cent of all households in the pilot programme had applied to buy their 
home by early November 2016. This varied from 0.8 per cent in Saffron to 2.8 
per cent in Riverside.  5.9 per cent of households in eligible properties in the pilot programme had 
applied to buy their home by early November 2016.  Saffron and Thames Valley 
were the pilots with the lowest rate of applicants, at 2.3 per cent, with Riverside 
having the highest rate, at 9.1 per cent. 
Table 7.2: Interest in and Demand for VRTB, at 3 November 2016 
  L&Q Riverside Saffron Sovereign TVH Total 
Total number of households in 
pilot area 
18,667 21,000 4,800 7,988 1,500 53,955 
Households in eligible properties 
within the pilot area 
5,712 6,519 1,600 1,601 954 16,386 
Expressions of interest from 
eligible tenants 
 1,894 1,70023    116  555   140 4,405 
Applications processed 219 591 37 103 22 972 
Proportion of total households 
expressing an interest 
 10.1%  8.1%  2.4%  6.9%  9.3%  8.2%  
Proportion of eligible households 
expressing an interest 
 33.2% 26.1%  7.2%  34.7%  14.7%  26.9%  
Applications as a proportion of 
total households 
1.1% 2.8% 0.8% 1.3% 1.5% 1.8% 
Applications as a proportion of 
eligible households 
3.8% 9.1% 2.3% 6.4% 2.3% 5.9% 
These figures on take-up may not, however, reveal the full extent of interest in 
VRTB. The approach to exclusions in some of the pilots may have limited the 
number of applications in some areas and one of the pilots (L&Q) had to 'freeze' 
                                               
22
 At the outset, some landlords excluded certain properties (supported housing in one case, but not in others) 
from the pilot and these were never considered 'in-scope'. Other types of properties ultimately excluded 
(preserved right to buy, for example, and older people's housing in several pilots) were initially considered 'in-
scope'. See Chapter Three for details of the exclusion policy in each pilot.  
23
 approximate figure 
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applications at one point in order to manage the level of demand. The confirmation of 
a future national roll-out once Royal Assent was granted may have also affected 
some tenants' decisions over the timing of their applications, even if they did not 
know when the national scheme was to be launched.  In addition, there remained a 
significant number of households who had expressed an interest in the VRTB but 
had not (yet) made an application. The future intentions of this group may be crucial 
in determining a firmer estimate of the level of take-up. In the next section we 
consider some of the factors affecting levels of interest in the VRTB in the pilot 
programme. 
7.2. Factors affecting apparent demand for the VRTB in the pilot programme 
Factors potentially affecting the numbers of EOIs and full applications in the pilot 
programme include: 
 Outstanding demand from EOIs in the system. The results of our initial online 
survey suggested that many households who had expressed an interest in 
VRTB but had not made a full application, may yet do so. In April 2016 our 
survey of all tenants who had expressed an interest in the VRTB found that 51 
per cent had not made a full application. Of these, nearly all (95 per cent) said 
they still intended to apply or may do so at some point in the future (see Figure 
7.1). A follow-up survey of this group of tenants in August 2016 suggests that 
strong interest from this cohort remained. Only 10 per cent reported no intention 
of applying, and 29 per cent had already applied (see Figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.1: Will you make an application in the future? (online survey, 
tenants who had not already applied, N = 319) 
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Figure 7.2: EOI Tenants' Situations/intentions (follow-up survey N=126) 
 
  Waiting for the national roll-out.  After the Housing and Planning Bill received 
Royal Assent in May 2016, some tenants reconsidered the timing of their 
applications. For example, 26 per cent of respondents to the follow-up survey24 
said they were waiting for the national roll-out to make their application.  In fact a 
further large-scale regional pilot rather than a national programme was 
announced in the Autumn Statement in November 2016,  Exclusion policies. As noted in Chapter 3, the relatively short timescales 
associated with the pilot programme - for preparation and delivery - demanded a 
pragmatic approach to exclusions that led to more properties being excluded 
from the programme than may be the case in the national scheme. Associations 
may also be more reluctant to exclude properties in regional pilot and the 
national scheme (where they have some discretion), to limit the number of 
tenants who would then be able to exercise the portable discount. All the 
tenants interviewed who had not been able to progress from an EOI to a full 
application because their property was excluded said they would apply if they 
could under the national scheme. Of course it is not possible to tell whether 
these applicants would have progressed through to a completed sale - as this 
would have depended on the valuation, the discounted purchase price and their 
ability to secure the necessary finance - but it is likely most would have made a 
full application. In addition, some pilots had a higher proportion of excluded 
properties than others. Those with transferred local authority housing stock, for 
example, had a cohort of tenants who could not apply for the VRTB because 
they were eligible for the Preserved Right to Buy (PRTB): in Riverside, this 
accounted for around 15 per cent of all households in-scope.  
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 The exclusion of the portable discount from the pilot programme. As stated 
earlier, applicants in the pilot programme did not have access to a portable 
discount, if their property was excluded from the VRTB scheme. It is likely that 
these tenants will be eligible for a portable discount under the regional pilot and 
the national programme, and have access to exercise their VRTB on a property 
elsewhere, if they meet the eligibility criteria. At the time of writing the future 
arrangements for the portable discount have not been specified. However, if 
certain tenants are able to exercise this option, this will increase the level of 
take-up for VRTB overall.    Rationing - each pilot housing association agreed on an indicative 'quota' for 
completions. However, as stated earlier, L&Q 'froze' all applications in their 
system in March 2016, due to concerns about raising tenant expectations at a 
time when the national scheme had not received Royal Assent (so there was no 
guarantee of any sales beyond the pilot stage), and in the light of very high 
levels of EOIs and applications. It is likely that the number of EOIs and 
applications in this pilot would have been much higher had their scheme 
remained open. For example, of the very small number (45) of respondents to 
the follow-up survey who reported no intention to apply, 13 said they were not 
proceeding because the 'landlord was oversubscribed'. All but one of these said 
they would definitely (11) or probably (1) have applied otherwise (see Figure 
7.3). Several respondents in the qualitative interviews were among those told 
they could not proceed to an application because of high levels of demand and 
all were keen to exercise the VRTB.  
Figure 7.3: Reasons for not going ahead with full application - (follow-up 
survey n=45) 
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Of course we do not know how many of the 972 applicants (at November 2016) will 
proceed to sale. That is the ultimate indication of effective demand for the VRTB and 
this will become clearer over the coming few months. It may be that some applicants 
currently in the system will not be able to proceed. In Chapter 8, for example, we 
raise questions about the proportion of current applicants who could afford to 
purchase, particularly in some areas. Our analysis tentatively indicates that some 
pilots may witness drop-outs at this stage. We do know, however, that many more 
tenants are indicating an interest in applying to buy their home than the figures in 
Table 7.1 indicate. The eventual level of take-up is likely to be somewhat higher than 
the 5.2 per cent recorded there. 
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8 8. Can tenants afford to buy 
their homes through the VRTB?  
In Chapter 7 we reported on demand for the VRTB across the pilot programme, as 
indicated by numbers of EOIs and applications. We also suggested that demand 
may be higher than these initial figures indicate - a high proportion of tenants 
expressing an interest still intend to apply, and a range of factors may have 
suppressed demand in the pilot. However, with completions still in the very early 
stages, we do not yet know how much of this 'demand' will translate into actual sales. 
A key factor will be the ability of tenants to buy, taking into account the house price 
and their incomes, savings, and access to other finance (third party contributions, 
mortgages). 
In this chapter we assess tenants' financial circumstances and compare these with 
property values in the pilot to draw some tentative conclusions about the proportion 
of tenants who may be able to afford to proceed with a sale. We also explore 
whether tenants intending to purchase know they are in a position to do so. For 
example, do they have a clear idea of the purchase price and their eligibility for 
finance?  If tenants' decisions to purchase are not fully informed, one might expect a 
relatively high drop-out rate where there is a mismatch between financial 
circumstances and property values.  
8.1. The Financial Circumstances of Applicants 
In making an application for VRTB, all applicants were asked about their income, but 
under the pressure of time, the pilot associations did not record this information in a 
consistent way across the programme.  We therefore relied on the responses to the 
online survey for analysis of applicants' household income. Table 8.1 shows that 59 
per cent of applicants had an annual household income of less than £32,000. While 
a direct comparison is not possible, this is likely to be higher than the average 
income for housing association households. For example, internal analysis by NHF 
of Bank of England data shows that 50 per cent of tenants had a household income 
of less than £18,000. There was some evidence from the survey that small 
households and older households had lower incomes, but in general income levels 
were fairly stable across a range of different factors. Of course, the ten year eligibility 
rule will mean that younger households will be under-represented among VRTB 
applicants.  
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Figure 8.1: Gross Household Income (online tenant survey, N = 389) 
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tenants had no savings and 90 per cent had less than £12k. 
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Figure 8.2: Household savings of applicants (application forms, N=398) 
 
Some interview and survey respondents were in stable, secure financial 
circumstances, with relatively high incomes and savings. But, more commonly, there 
were tenants in financial circumstances rather more precarious than one might 
expect from a potential purchaser. In some cases it was questionable whether 
respondents could afford to buy without significant financial risk, raising questions 
about whether greater emphasis should or could be placed on 'affordability checks' 
as part of the VRTB process. Several interview respondents, for example, reported 
stretching themselves in order to raise the £250 admin fee, others were proceeding 
with the purchase without a clear idea of how they would fund legal fees, and others 
reported no savings or any kind of buffer to fall back on, for example in the event of a 
period of illness or unexpected large expense. Those buying with mortgages were 
usually borrowing at or very close to their limit in a context of relatively low interest 
rates (see Figure 8.5 below for further discussion about income to mortgage ratios).  
There was some evidence of tenants artificially (and temporarily) boosting their 
income through overtime to secure mortgages for the right to buy scheme. Mortgage 
payments were often estimated to be the same or lower than rental payment but 
were sometimes higher, in some cases by more than £100pcm (and in one case by 
an estimated £200).  When asked how affordable such increases were, respondents 
tended to place emphasis on increased costs being worth it rather than being 
affordable. As one respondent explained - 'I'll be skint but at least I'll be a 
homeowner' (Richard). Tenants' relief at not being required to pay a deposit, while 
understandable, revealed their constrained financial circumstances. For example:   
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There were many tenants who were financially secure enough to be able to buy their 
homes without significant risk.  Charts 8.1 and 8.2 show, for example, that a 
significant minority of survey respondents had relatively sizeable incomes and 
savings.  There were also examples where tenants were able to finance borrowing, 
and mitigate risk, by taking out joint mortgages with family members (see example in 
8.5 below).  However many of the tenants interviewed for this study appeared to be 
exposing themselves to future financial risk by buying, whether because they were 
stretching themselves to meet mortgage payments, had no buffer (savings, high 
disposable income, family able to help out), or were in single income households.  
The precarious borrowing circumstances of some tenants raises questions about 
whether housing associations will need to do more to subject applications to closer 
scrutiny - in terms of the cost of purchase but also the ongoing costs of home 
ownership, which may be underestimated by eager VRTB applicants – and what the 
response might be if tenants were felt to be at risk but keen to buy. In Box 1 we 
present two case studies that illustrate some of these points.  
Box 1: Case studies – stretched financial circumstances [All – we could 
slightly reframe this and perhaps add another example …  
Rachel, in her 70s, is in a quandary about whether to proceed with the purchase 
now she has received an offer (of £25k) slightly higher than hoped. Her savings are 
sufficient to purchase outright but this would leave very little of her nest egg - 'that 
would leave me with only about £6,000 to live on and I don’t feel safe about it.' The 
property is in relatively poor condition - 'there's rising damp and very bad 
condensation that will be costly to put right' and Rachel is also concerned about the 
legal costs associated with buying which would further reduce her savings.   
Maggs is a single parent who describes herself as 'on a very low wage' who 'had a 
struggle to get the £250'. Her family are not in a position to offer a contribution ('my 
parents don't have any money anyway') and she has no savings - 'any savings that I 
had I've spent while being unemployed for I don't know how long'. She was hoping to 
mortgage for slightly more than the purchase price to cover conveyancing and other 
fees, but is borrowing at the top of her limit so will have to fund these expenses 
herself. She has a fixed rate mortgage and is concerned about interest rate rises 
beyond that, although at present her mortgage payments are no more than her rent. 
She has not, however, considered the additional costs of home ownership such as 
insurance and property maintenance explaining that 'I haven't [considered that]. No, I 
don't want to basically, what will be will be'. She is relying on low maintenance costs 
because her house is 'not a period property or anything that's going to be draining 
you money every month, fingers crossed'. She has been taking on as much overtime 
as possible recently (she works two jobs) so her income seems higher, in order to 
secure a large enough mortgage. This raises concerns about the longer term 
sustainability of borrowing. 
8.2. Awareness and Understanding of the Viability of Purchasing 
We saw in Chapter 5 that a high proportion of tenants expressing an interest in the 
right to buy reported an intention to apply and that (by November 2016) 972 
applications had been processed. Applicants had committed to the process by 
paying the £250 administration fee.  
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These tenants seem intent on proceeding if they can. Yet, when we explored how 
well informed tenants are about the viability of purchasing their homes, we find 
significant gaps in the knowledge and information required to make such a decision. 
Some respondents had researched extensively - checking Zoopla, comparing 
mortgage repayments to rents - but others had little idea of the value of their home, 
had not explored mortgage eligibility or were making poorly informed assumptions 
about lender practices, costs, and the viability of buying.. 
For example, many tenants did not know the value of their home or the purchase 
price. Figure 8.3 shows that 71 per cent reported having 'no idea' of the purchase 
price, and only eight per cent knew what the purchase price would be (a further 21 
per cent had 'some idea'). Interview respondents, similarly, when asked about 
valuation frequently responded 'no clue' (Sarah-Jane), 'I haven't got a clue' or 'I don't 
know how much they go for in this area. I have no clue really.'(Paul). There was a 
widespread tendency to underestimate the price of the home, especially in London  
The majority of tenants required a mortgage for some or all of the purchase price. 
Figure 8.3, for example, shows that 89 per cent of survey respondents intended to 
use mortgage finance to help purchase their home. Over two thirds (69 per cent) of 
these tenants also reported being very or fairly confident that they could secure a 
mortgage. Yet the majority had no idea of the purchase price at that time - a 
prerequisite for a mortgage application.  
Figure 8.3: Do you know the likely purchase price of your home? (online tenant 
survey, N = 543) 
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London home and that mortgage payments will be lower than his rent. Yet he does 
not know the value of his home, or how much his rent is (see Box 2). 
It is worth noting, however, that the information tenants required to make informed 
decisions about buying their homes was not always readily available.  As reported in 
Chapter 5, property valuations were not carried out until a full application had been 
made and the fee paid,25 and tenants were discouraged, for good reasons, from  
securing a mortgage until they had received an offer letter (the point at which the 
purchase price is stated).  Thus, even tenants who made concerted efforts to 
research the viability of purchasing were not always able to make an informed 
decision about applying.   
In particular, tenants struggled to gauge the value of their property. Tenants were 
encouraged by the pilot landlords to research property prices in their neighbourhood 
- for example using Zoopla - but interview respondents explained that accurate data 
was not always available, for example if there had been few recent sales nearby, or 
no equivalent properties sold. As the following respondents explained: 
It's anyone's guess really [valuation]. I went looking round on Zoopla and 
various estate agents online to try and get a feel for property prices but the 
nearest I could get was a two-bedroomed flat (Phil, living in a one-bed flat) 
What made it difficult was that when I researched the property there was nothing 
in the area similar, cos they’re social housing, so there was nothing in the area 
that I could get a guideline from. So I had about 300 in my head actually and 
that was based on colleagues that had friends that were selling smaller 
properties. And I just looked at three bed terraced houses in the area, not like 
for like, just the range of three beds and thought these are older houses and 
they were going for about 350. So I was thinking this is social housing, maybe 
we’re pitching it between 300 and 350. So I was surprised when it came back at 
380. (Jude) 
The information presented in this section raises questions about the extent to which 
tenants who express an interest, and also those who had applied for the VRTB, are 
in a position to proceed.  
The information that has started to come forward once valuations of the properties 
were being made is therefore essential in order to make any judgement on the likely 
affordability of VRTB for applicants in each pilot area. This is considered next. 
  
                                               
25
 Valuations were not carried out until the Housing and Planning Act had been passed so some early applicants 
experienced a period of inactivity following their application, and had to wait a while before they were informed of 
the valuation and purchase price.   
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Box 2: Case studies: financial knowledge  
Billy has applied to buy his London home because, he thinks, mortgage payments 
would be similar to his rent (Billy was informed subsequently that his property is 
excluded and so has not proceeded further). This assumption was based on the view 
that, with rents being so high in London, a mortgage could not possibly cost more.  
Billy did not, however, know how much his rent was, nor had he explored mortgage 
eligibility or costs. He explained: 
Well it’s a simple matter of economics, I’m paying that much money in rent, if I 
can pay that much money on a mortgage it would be the same sort of 
difference…. I think rents are so high now in London there’s no way that people 
would be paying more money on a mortgage. It’s just that it’ll be going 
somewhere instead of renting your money’s going nowhere….I don’t know what 
the rent is, £150/week or whatever it is, £175/week. 
Martin is self-employed, earning his living buying and selling second hand goods 
online from home. He has no savings. He estimates that his flat may be worth 
between £400-£500k, based on the sale prices of local properties. He heard from his 
sister, who once worked as an estate agent, about interest-only mortgages and is 
pinning his hopes on financing a purchase in this way. Martin is making many 
assumptions about lender practices on the basis of scant and outdated information 
from his sister: 
They see that you're getting a deal where you're getting 100 grand knocked off 
then they'll lend you the money against that….cos the mortgage company can 
see why I'm doing it. My sister said they'll probably jump at the chance. I'm self-
employed, I don't think they'd even want to know [see] my books but I'm 
confident that the amount of money paying back is only about £10 more than I'm 
paying now. [Interviewer: have you got much of a deposit to put down?) I didn't 
know there was much of a deposit actually needed. An interest-only mortgage I 
don't think you need a deposit. That's something I don't know. My sister maybe 
told me about it but it didn't go in my head 
Whether a lender would provide a mortgage of this amount to Martin given his 
income and employment status is questionable. But, in any case, interest-only 
mortgages require purchasers to have a credible financial strategy (such as an 
investment) for repaying the (in this case very substantial) loan at the end of the 
mortgage term.  
Paul, who expressed an interest in the RTB but has not submitted an application, has 
decided he cannot currently afford to buy his property. But this decision does not 
appear to be based on any clear understanding of value, purchase price, or 
mortgage eligibility (he is employed part time and has lived in the property for 30 
years). He did not know how the discount was calculated or whether there was a cap, 
expressing surprise when informed that discounts in London were capped at £103k 
(he thought it would be higher). When asked if he knew the approximate value of his 
home he replied that 'well, it's a one bedroomed flat and I don't know how much they 
go for in this area. I have no clue really' 
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8.3. Valuations in the Pilot Areas 
Analysis was undertaken on 282 valuations across the pilots, as shown in Table 8.1 
and Figure 8.4 below. It is important to note that these figures are the market 
valuations and not the purchase price to the tenant, once discounts (which will vary 
of course from one applicant to the next) are taken into account. The charts show the 
difference in the average valuation by pilot association - ranging from £93,600 in 
Riverside to £374,400 in L&Q - a figure just over four times greater. However, these 
averages conceal a much wider spread of values within L&Q than in other pilots - 
ranging from £180,500 to £650,000. It is also worth noting the very low valuations of 
some Riverside properties at £40,000 - before any discounts are taken into account.  
Valuations therefore vary dramatically from one pilot area to another. But this is not 
matched by parallel variations in the income and savings of the households - the 
differences here are small. There is limited evidence of higher savings among L&Q 
households, and household incomes are broadly stable across the pilot areas. Even 
allowing for discounts, this produces marked difference in the income-price 
affordability ratio from one pilot to another - and especially between the extremes of 
L&Q and Riverside.  
Table 8.1: Key statistics on valuations in the pilots (August 2016) 
 L&Q Riverside Saffron Sovereign TVH 
Mean £374,800 £93,600 £164,400 £240,700 £307,000 
Min £180,500 £40,000 £100,000 £190,000 £200,000 
Max £650,000 £275,000 £230,000 £310,000 £450,000 
Number 65 163 39 49 5 
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Figure 8.4: Valuations by pilot area, up to August 201626 
 
 
8.4. Affordability and expected completions 
It is possible to match the valuations in section 8.4 to data on household incomes 
and savings from application forms and the online tenant survey. This provides an 
indication of likely mortgage affordability. Changes in the mortgage market since 
the Global Financial Crisis provide the context for assessing affordability in the pilots. 
The Financial Conduct Authority has supported a shift towards in-depth assessment 
of mortgage affordability, based on household circumstances and not just loan to 
income ratios. However, loan to income ratios are still used to provide a bald 
indication of the level of risk attached to loans. The Financial Policy Committee 
recommends a 'cap at 15 per cent in the total number of residential mortgages 
available at or above 4.5 times income' (Financial Conduct Authority, 2016). In June 
2016, 11 per cent of all regulated mortgages to individuals had a loan to income ratio 
of greater than four (Bank of England/Financial Conduct Authority, 2016). These 
figures provide a baseline to understand the valuations for the VRTB pilots.  
A calculation of loan to income for VRTB valuations for three of the pilots can be 
seen in Figure 8.5. 27  This calculation takes account of the discount, and it is 
assumed that the reported savings of the household are used in full to reduce the 
purchase price further.28 The analysis includes those who reported that they had 
sufficient savings to purchase outright. 
                                               
26
 The range in Riverside is slightly skewed by the outlier of the £275,000 property included in the sample. 
27
 There were not sufficient numbers of valuations to undertake this for Saffron and Thames Valley. 
28
 Only a small number of applicants reported having sufficient savings to purchase outright. They were included 
in the analysis to give an indication of the affordability of all applicants. 
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The results in Figure 8.5 show that just over a third of applicants at Sovereign (36 
per cent) and just under a third at L&Q (31 per cent) have income multipliers of less 
than four (including outright purchase). These applicants are likely to be able to 
access mortgages to enable purchase. For Riverside, nine out of ten applicants (91 
per cent) have income multipliers of less than four. 
The variation in the L&Q valuations is important. The number of completions may 
depend on the availability of stock in the lower half of their values that match with 
incomes of tenants in this accommodation. The figures alone would suggest that the 
relatively high proportion of applicants (37 per cent in L&Q and 20 per cent in 
Sovereign) requiring more than six times their income to afford VRTB purchase 
would have to drop out of the process.  However, as shown in the next section, some 
of these applicants do appear to be proceeding with purchase.  
Figure 8.5: Income multipliers for applicants receiving a valuation (after 
discount and savings) 
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8.5. Plugging the 'affordability gap' 
The analysis presented in the preceding section suggests that a relatively high 
proportion of applicants in some pilots may not be able to afford to proceed to 
completion. Yet, at the time of writing, few applicants were withdrawing from the 
process, including some requiring mortgages in excess of four times their income, or 
where the combined sum of their mortgage, savings and any third party contribution 
did not provide sufficient funds to meet the purchase price.  
The research team interviewed some of these tenants in an effort to understand how 
they were plugging their 'affordability gap'. However, so few had completed by this 
time that questions about whether, and how, they could afford to purchase remained 
hypothetical. Generally speaking, respondents simply restated that they were 
confident they could meet the purchase price through a combination of mortgages, 
savings and third party contributions, and were confident they could meet monthly 
mortgage payments.29 Only a few reported strategies for overcoming affordability 
issues. This included a woman who had secured a mortgage from an 'adverse credit 
mortgage provider' (a single parent to five children, earning £28k pa, Olubunmi has 
secured a mortgage of £221k over 35 years but still has a £25k shortfall that she is 
trying to meet through family contribution); and a couple of respondents exploring 
interest-only mortgages (although they are unlikely to meet the criteria).More 
positively, another respondent had found a way to proceed with the purchase without 
stretching herself financially, or exposing herself to the risks of adverse credit and 
interest only lending, by purchasing jointly with her son. Her situation is described in 
Box 3).  
 
Box 2: Case studies: Plugging the 'affordability gap'  
Jude has been renting from her landlord for 23 years and has lived in her current 
home - a three bed terraced house - for 16 years. She has always wanted to own her 
own home, as she explained: 
 Renting wasn’t something I wanted to do forever and really it’s also to leave 
 something for my children when I move on, so that’s the main reason, I just 
 don’t really like the idea of renting because you never own. There’s also only 
 so much really that you can do to the property 
Despite earning a good income, she could never quite manage to save a large 
enough deposit to buy on the open market. When the opportunity arose through the 
VRTB pilot to buy her home at a discount she applied straight away. However, when 
she received the valuation and approached mortgage providers she was told her 
income was not high enough to qualify for the mortgage she needed. 
 I spoke to two mortgage brokers and the first thing they said is you will not get 
 the mortgage on the full amount, even though I’d got some money saved, 
                                               
29
 The research team intend to conduct another round of interviews once more tenants have completed which 
may provide further insight.  
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 62 
 they still said you won’t get a mortgage, your salary’s just not enough, cos I’d 
 need something like seven times my salary…. 
 The valuation came in at 380 and then I get the maximum 103 discount but 
 obviously the way that mortgages are now, I needed to be earning 80,000 
 and not many average people who are in social housing would be earning 
 80,000.   
However, by combining her income with that of her adult son, they are eligible for a 
joint mortgage that is affordable to them and this is how Jude (and her son) are 
financing their purchase. They have made a new, joint application that has been 
accepted.   
It would also seem that the propensity of lenders to lend to households on modest 
incomes varies considerably between the pilots, and this practice may mitigate the 
extent of differences in affordability between higher and lower value areas. At the 
time of writing this report, evidence was beginning to emerge that (in London, at least) 
high street lenders were offering VRTB tenants mortgages for more than four times 
their household income.  
Analysis was undertaken of 25 L&Q tenants who had completed the purchase of their 
homes under VRTB by November 2016.  Clearly this is too small a sample to draw 
any general conclusions, but the findings help to provide an indication of the financial 
profile of purchasers in the London market.  All these households had benefited from 
the maximum £103.9k discount (representing an average of 32 per cent discount off 
the full price of the property).  Four of the households required no mortgage and had 
bought outright - one benefiting from a substantial family gift and others buying from 
their savings.  Four of the households depended fully on their mortgage to pay for 
their home (with the discount being treated as their 'deposit').  Of the remaining 17 
households, savings contributed on average to 10.5 per cent of the post-discount 
price.  The remaining amount was being met through mortgage payments.   
In terms of the mortgage to income ratios for the 21 households30 , three had been 
given mortgages at up to three times their income, nine at between three and four 
times their income, seven at between four and five times their income and two at 
more than five times their income.  From this admittedly very small sample, more 
than forty per cent of households were therefore receiving a mortgage at more than 
four times their income.  The highest multiple was 5.4, for a household with an 
annual income of £28k receiving a mortgage of £151.8k.  The largest mortgage was 
£371k.  Interest rates on the mortgages ranged from 1.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent and 
the mean rate was 2.2 per cent.  In each case the mortgage had been provided by a 
high street lender.  This profile is bound to raise concerns - particularly in the context 
of the broader financial circumstances of some tenants outlined in 8.1 above- that 
some tenants may be significantly overreaching themselves, especially in high value 
areas.    
Clearly there will be some tenants who are able to buy without undue risk.  However 
this Chapter has raised important questions about the risks that some tenants may 
                                               
30
 excludign the four hosueholds who had bought outright 
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take in order to take advantage of the opportunity to buy. In many cases the desire to 
take on risk reflected a feeling that purchase would give the family security.  The 
issue of risk and affordability raises important and challenging issues for HAs in 
relation to providing safeguards where it is felt that tenants cannot afford to purchase.  
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9 9. Profiling the VRTB: which 
tenants are buying, and what stock 
is being bought?  
9.1. Profiling demand for the Voluntary Right to Buy 
The application forms submitted by tenants intending to exercise their Right to Buy 
provide details of household and stock characteristics. Analysis of application forms31 
shows that:   
 More women than men were lead applicant (60 per cent versus 40 per cent)   The majority of applicants were White British and Irish (73 per cent)   Most commonly applicants were aged 45-54 (37 per cent) with only nine per 
cent aged 65 or over (see Figure 9.1). These older applicants were not, however, 
distributed equally across the pilots - they comprised 15 per cent of all Riverside 
applicants but only three per cent of those in L&Q.  Over three quarters of applicants lived in houses (75 per cent), while 21 per cent 
of applicants lived in flats or maisonettes (see Figure 9.2). A higher proportion of 
L&Q applicants lived in flats than applicants in the other pilots, partly reflecting 
the stock profile of that landlord. Only three per cent of applicants lived in 
bungalows. This will partly reflect the fact that some bungalow accommodation 
will have been excluded by pilot housing associations on the grounds of being 
housing for older persons or adapted accommodation.   Applications were mostly for two and three bed properties.  14 per cent of applicants reported someone in their household with a disability.  Nearly half (45 per cent) of applicants lived in smaller households, either alone 
or with one other household member. 
                                               
31
 A total of 428 application forms were analysed, representing all applications forms received by April 2016. 
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Figure 9.1: Age of lead applicant (Application forms, N = 420) 
 
Figure 9.2: Type of property (Application forms, N = 360) 
 
The profile of respondents to the online survey (all of whom had expressed an 
interest and around half of whom had made a full application) was similar, although it 
should be noted that this sample included tenants who had not (yet) applied. For 
example, middle aged survey respondents formed the largest group of those 
interested in the VRTB (see Figure 9.3), with Riverside receiving higher levels of 
interest from tenants over the age of 65 than the other pilots. In line with the profile of 
applicants, 21 per cent of online survey respondents lived alone, although a higher 
proportion lived in two person households (Figure 9.4). It is perhaps of interest that 
nearly one quarter (24 per cent) lived with adult children. Figure 9.5 shows that a 
slightly lower proportion of online survey respondents than applicants lived in houses 
(63 per cent) and a higher proportion in flats (35 per cent).  
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Figure 9.3: Age of lead applicant (online survey, N = 583) 
 
Figure 9.4: Household size (applicants: online survey) 
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Figure 9.5: Property type (online tenant survey, N = 577) 
 
At this stage analysis can only profile interest or demand in the VRTB. We do not yet 
know how many tenants responding to our online survey will pursue their initial 
interest in the scheme, or indeed how many applicants will secure the finance they 
need and complete on their purchase (see Chapter 8). This picture could shift, 
therefore, as more tenants apply, and sales proceed.  
9.2. Demand compared to characteristics of pilot areas 
The figures presented in section 9.1 above - while interesting - mean little without an 
understanding of the wider tenant and stock profile of each of the pilot housing 
associations. Women, for example, may comprise 60 per cent of all applicants but if 
they represent 80 per cent of all housing association tenants then they are less likely, 
not more likely, than men likely to apply for the RTB. Here we consider the profile of 
applicants (based on application form data) and of online survey respondents (EOIs 
and applicants). We then use secondary data to assess how representative they are 
of the tenants and stock in the wider pilot areas. 32  The results are most robust in the 
pilots with the largest number of applications and EOIs.  
Analysis suggests that particular demographic groups, and particular property types, 
are overrepresented in the VRTB pilot, including:  
 Houses, compared with flats. Houses account for 51 per cent of stock across all 
of the pilot areas but 76 per cent of applicants.33  Three-bed properties. Across all of the pilot areas three bed properties 
accounted for 35 per cent of stock. In comparison 57 per cent of applicants were 
living in a three bed property.34  
                                               
32
 This relates to all stock in the pilot areas, not just eligible properties. 
33
 This figure is slightly skewed by the relatively high number of Riverside tenants in the application form data 
(and the very high demand for houses from Riverside tenants). A lower proportion of survey respondents (63 per 
cent) were seeking to purchase a house. 
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 Middle aged tenants. The age group of 45 to 54 year olds account for 37 per 
cent of lead applicants (amongst both 'applicants' and survey respondents). Age 
data is not available at pilot level but 35 to 49 year olds accounted for 29 per 
cent of Housing Association tenants in 2011.35 Two factors are likely to support 
this over-representation of middle aged tenants. The first is the ten year 
qualification period, rendering many younger tenants ineligible. Second, difficulty 
accessing a mortgage for people who are retired is likely to reduce demand from 
this group, particularly in higher value areas where savings, pension lump sums 
and suchlike are less likely to cover full purchase price.   People with higher incomes.36 The online survey suggests that 23 per cent of 
tenants expressing an interest or applying had a gross household income of 
more than £41,600 per annum. Income data is not available across the pilots but, 
as noted in the previous section, this proportion is much higher than levels 
recorded in national data. It is likely that this over-representation reflects a level 
of self-selection about the affordability of VRTB amongst those expressing an 
interest or applying.  
This gives some indication of the tenants who may be most likely to exercise the 
VRTB, and of the stock most likely to be sold. It must be emphasised again, however, 
that analysis at this stage is indicative only. It is only once the pilots have seen a 
significant number of completions that firm conclusions can be drawn.   
Although this picture generally holds across the five pilots, there was some variation 
in demand for particular locations, from certain tenants, and for particular property 
types. For example, houses were in high demand across the programme but slightly 
less so in L&Q than in Riverside and Sovereign. Riverside applicants, meanwhile, 
had a slightly older age profile than in the other pilots. It is useful, therefore, to 
summarise some of the key characteristics associated with demand in each of the 
pilots. 
In L&Q37 demand was notably higher for particular locations, larger properties and 
houses. Specifically: 
 In terms of geography, applications were in proportion to the number of 
properties held in each local authority area. Exceptions to this trend were 
Newham where demand was relatively high (20 per cent of applicants compared 
to eight per cent of L&Q stock) and Lewisham where demand was relatively low 
(nine per cent of applicants compared to 29 per cent of L&Q stock).  A relatively high proportion of applicants were living in a house (59 per cent38 
compared to 38 per cent of L&Q stock). 
                                                                                                                                                  
34Again, this figure is slightly skewed by the overrepresentation of Riverside tenants in the application from data. 
A slightly lower 49 per cent survey respondents were living in a three bed property.. 
35
 Authors calculations based on table DC4201EW of the 2011 census for England. 
36
 This analysis is based on survey data only. Income was inconsistently recorded by tenants in their application 
forms.  
37
 Data on EOIs and applicants taken from online tenant survey (N = 371) and applicants only from application 
forms (N = 87). Data on L&Q stock supplied by the Housing Association and analysed by the authors. 
38
 There was a slightly lower proportion (51 per cent) of online survey respondents living in houses. 
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 Demand was higher for larger properties (50 per cent of applicants39 lived in a 
property with three or more bedrooms compared to 36 per cent of L&Q stock.) 
In Riverside40 demand was relatively uniform across the pilot with no local authority 
area witnessing disproportionately high or low demand. Demand was notably higher, 
however, from older tenants, with higher incomes, living in larger properties. 
Specifically: 
 Demand for houses in Riverside was very high with 84 per cent of applicants41 
living in houses compared with 61 per cent across the pilots as a whole.  Applicants were more likely to live in three bed properties (61 per cent) than 
tenants in the pilot area as a whole (39 per cent); and less likely to live in one-
bed properties (just seven per cent of applicants compared to 24 per cent of 
Riverside stock in the pilot area).42   Riverside applicants had a slightly older age profile than tenants across the pilot 
area: 36 per cent were aged 45-54 (compared to 21 per cent in the pilot area as 
a whole) and 27 per cent were 55 to 64 years (compared to 19 per cent).43  Riverside survey respondents had incomes notably higher than across the pilot 
area as a whole. For example 43 per cent reported a household income of 
greater than £26,000 compared to just four per cent across the pilot area. 
In Sovereign44 demand was notably higher from working age households with higher 
incomes living in larger properties. For example: 
 Demand for houses in Sovereign was high, with 85 per cent of online survey 
respondents living in houses (compared with 66 per cent across the pilot).   61 per cent of VRTB tenants were living in three-bed properties compared to 41 
per cent across the pilot. In contrast, one bed properties accounted for one per 
cent of VRTB tenants compared to 19 per cent across the pilot area.   Only 10 per cent of online survey respondents were aged 60 years or over 
compared to 34 per cent of the pilot area as a whole.45  Online survey respondents in Sovereign had incomes notably higher than 
across the pilot area as a whole. For example 46 per cent reported a household 
income of less than £32,000, compared to 76 per cent with an income of less 
than £30,000 across the pilot area. 
                                               
39
 And a slightly lower 46 per cent of online survey respondents.. 
40
 Data on EOIs and applicants taken from online tenant survey (N = 137) and applicants only from application 
forms (N = 214). Data on Riverside stock supplied by the Housing Association. 
41
 And 81 per cent of online survey respondents  
42
 Results from the online survey were very similar. 
43
 Results from the online survey were very similar. 
44
 Data on EOIs and applicants taken from online tenant survey (N = 86) and applicants only from application 
forms (N = 67). Data on Sovereign stock supplied by the Housing Association. 
45
 For comparison, 4.5 per cent of applicants were aged 65 years or older. 
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In Saffron and Thames Valley the number of EOIs and applications were much 
lower, making it difficult to identify wider trends. However, there is some evidence 
that: 
 Houses were in relatively high demand in Saffron. Bungalows account for 38 per 
cent of stock in this Housing Association but only around one-fifth of applications.  Larger properties were overrepresented in Saffron. Three-bed properties 
account for 38 per cent of properties but almost three-quarters of applicants.  Three-bed properties were also overrepresented amongst applications in 
Thames Valley - accounting for 28 per cent of properties but around half of 
applicants.  Middle aged tenants are overrepresented in Thames Valley. Tenants aged 45 to 
64 years account for 38 per cent of tenants but around half of applicants. 
9.3. Profile of demand for VRTB compared with Statutory Right to Buy.  
There are notable similarities, as well as some differences, between the stock and 
household profile of those applying for the VRTB and the local authority tenants who 
exercised the RTB under the statutory scheme.  
The demographic profile of tenants purchasing under the statutory RTB has changed 
over time.46 In the first phase, during the 1980s, a relatively high proportion of RTB 
purchasers were older, reflecting pent up demand and the larger discounts for longer 
term tenants. During the 1990s the most common household type was a two parent 
family with children at school. It appears that the profile of VRTB is more likely to 
reflect the early phases of the RTB for local authority tenants with pent-up demand 
from middle aged tenants. The household type is more likely in the VRTB than the 
statutory RTB to consist of single person households, which is representative of 
wider demographic shifts in this direction over the last thirty years.  
Property characteristics of the VRTB can also be compared to the statutory right to 
buy. Houses were disproportionately represented amongst RTB sales of local 
authority accommodation whilst flats and maisonettes were less popular. 47  More 
recently flats and maisonettes have made up a larger proportion of sales under the 
Preserved RTB. In 2014/15, Flats and maisonettes made up just less than half of 
Preserved RTB sales.48 At the same time bungalows accounted for just two per cent 
of sales. This can be compared to the property type for tenants interested in the 
VRTB (see Figure 9.2). As we saw in the previous section, houses accounted for 
almost two-thirds of tenants with only two per cent living in bungalows. However, 
these national figures highlight significant variation between the pilots, with almost 
half (49 per cent) of L&Q tenants seeking to buy a flat. 
                                               
46
 For a more detailed summary see: Cole, I. et al (2015) The Impact of the Existing Right to Buy and the 
Implications for the Proposed Extension of Right to Buy to Housing Associations 
47
 For a more detailed summary see: Cole, I. et al (2015) The Impact of the Existing Right to Buy and the 
Implications for the Proposed Extension of Right to Buy to Housing Associations. 
48
 Authors calculations based on data from CORE, UK Data Archive 7603.  
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Most statutory RTB purchasers were drawn from lower middle class or skilled 
working class backgrounds while only a minority of RTB purchasers had low incomes 
(Burrows, Ford and Wilcox, 2000). The VRTB appears to continue this trend - 
allowing those with higher incomes, compared to other social housing tenants, to 
purchase their homes. 
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10 10. Key Lessons and Messages 
The overall message of this report is that the VRTB pilot programme has been an 
effective way of testing out how the policy can be marketed, how applications can be 
handled, how ongoing challenges can be met or mitigated, and how applications can 
be dealt with through each stage from the expression of interest through to 
completion while meeting a tight timetable.  The pilot programme helps to anticipate 
future demand in different local housing contexts and highlights a range of issues 
that will need to be managed by housing associations.   
The number of associations included in the pilot was sufficient to achieve internal 
diversity without overwhelming the capacity to manage the programme in a coherent 
way.  The positive links developed between the pilots encouraged genuine mutual 
learning and proved to be invaluable in surmounting many of the obstacles that 
inevitably arose during the programme.   
The pilot associations faced challenges in anticipating and managing demand, 
especially at the two ends of the affordability/value spectrum (Riverside and L&Q), 
and in managing tenant expectations where applications were slowed or prevented 
by valuations or unexpected legal conditions on properties.  There was added 
pressure because of the understandable urgency of tenants wishing to purchase; 
and the fact that the pilot was being undertaken at the same time as the 
development of policy and procedures for the national programme.  The timing of the 
pilot programme therefore risked falling between two stools.  It was not possible for 
the programme to test out draft policy or procedures for the national scheme, 
because they had not been produced at the end of 2015.  In the event, the 
Chancellor announced a large-scale regional pilot of VRTB in the 2016 Autumn 
Statement.  Originally, there was also no time planned between the completion of the 
pilot programme and the determination of regulations for the national scheme.  As it 
happened, the launch of the regional pilot and then the wider programme is now later 
than originally expected, so there may be opportunity to incorporate some of the 
lessons from the pilot scheme into the regional pilot and the national VRTB 
programme.  
The pilot programme differs from the wider programme in several respects: the pilots 
were working to a finite timetable of just over a year and had a maximum number of 
600 RTB completions allocated to them as a whole; the portable discount did not 
apply for eligible tenants in excluded properties in the pilots; 'blanket' exclusions 
were applied in the pilots to some properties (such as those with S106 conditions) for 
pragmatic reasons; and pilots received additional resources  
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from DCLG to cover set-up costs and then a further amount on completions to ease 
the administrative burden.  Also, as we noted earlier, there are as yet insufficient 
households who have completed the RTB process in the pilot programme to enable 
a robust assessment to be made of the future level of take-up among eligible tenants. 
It would therefore be hazardous to transfer the lessons from the programme to a 
regional or national scale without any further qualification or note of caution.  Bearing 
these factors in mind, we indicate below some of the main lessons and messages 
that have emerged from the pilot programme so far (up to November 2016) which 
may have implications for all housing associations when the regional pilot and the 
national programme are launched.   
10.1. Eligibility for the VRTB 
 The application of exclusions (overall policy, the extent of variability between 
associations, identifying properties subject to covenants, resolving/renegotiating 
conditions so properties can be sold and so on) will be a key challenge in the 
national scheme.  The pilots were able to avoid some of the complexities of 
exclusion policy due to the short timescale and experimental nature of the 
programme.  There may be more reluctance in the regional pilot and the 
national scheme to exclude properties because of the requirement for a portable 
alternative discount, which did not apply to the pilots.  However, housing 
associations will be unable to make decisions on these issues until the 
expectations on the application of portable discounts have been finalised.  There 
is also the risk of geographical overlap in some areas, where different policies 
might apply to tenants in otherwise similar dwellings, depending on the practices 
of the landlord concerned.  It is therefore important for associations to identify all excluded properties in 
their stock at the outset, considering the knock-on implications for portable 
discounts.  Wherever possible, tenants should not be able to progress an 
application on a property where it is subsequently discovered that it cannot be 
sold.  Associations will need to weigh up the costs of identifying all excluded 
properties, against the likely level of customer dissatisfaction arising from 
identifying exclusions during the sale process.  The balance between these two 
options is likely to depend on the scale of the scheme and its likely impact on 
the association.  The pilot programme suggests that associations will need to invest time and 
resources to identify or resolve unexpected or unusual legal conditions and 
covenants that could lead to frustration and disappointment if they prevent sales  Tenant eligibility criteria was applied consistently across the pilot and this 
worked well, suggesting that a consistent national framework should be 
considered. Consistent approaches to tenant or property eligibility helps mitigate 
against variable practice in the same geographical area (i.e. where more than 
one housing association operates in the same areas).   
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10.2. Applying for the VRTB  
 Other associations should be encouraged to adopt many of the procedures 
developed by the pilots in terms of marketing, the process for expressing an 
interest, the handling of applications (e.g. forms, documentation required, and 
the applicability of digital and non-digital approaches).  Procedures for managing 
applications worked very well in the pilot programme.  Very few problems were 
highlighted, awareness of VRTB was high, and processes were considered to 
be relatively easy and straightforward by tenants.   Careful consideration should be given to the scope and timing of valuations. An 
offer of indicative valuations may provide a helpful 'reality check' for some 
applicants about the financial consequences of purchase, but it may cause 
problems subsequently if the formal valuation then differs substantially from the 
initial indication.  Tenants are likely to find it difficult to identify a direct and 
reliable comparator for their property if they try to undertake their own research 
into values. This may lead tenants to make unrealistic assumptions about their 
property, only to be pulled up short fairly late in the process.  
10.3. Impact on Housing Associations  
 The VRTB pilot placed significant additional demands on association staff and 
on their data management systems.  Associations need to have comprehensive 
and up-to-date information about their stock and their tenants.  What will be 
required is likely to go beyond what associations would need to know, were the 
properties to remain within their rented stock.  This may point to a need to 
develop partnerships and networks to share learning and (possibly) resources in 
preparation for VRTB, particularly for smaller associations with limited capacity.   More time should be built into the application process, for example in the time 
limits between instructing solicitors and completion and in the time (20 days in 
the pilot programme) between the landlord making an offer and the tenant 
accepting it.  Twenty days does not always give tenant enough time, especially 
where valuations are made relatively late in the process.   Managing tenant expectations may be very demanding. Because of the discount 
many tenants see VRTB as a 'golden opportunity' to realise aspirations and 
provide security for their family, so the stakes are high.  There is likely to be a 
fair amount of latent demand and tenants will tend to undervalue their properties. 
In this context, getting communication right is crucial.  Clarity and transparency 
on process, timings, progress and eligibility is key.   As one stakeholder put it: 
There’s a big ‘be prepared’.  The more you can sort out upfront, don’t be 
inventing it on the back foot, which is a bit hard in the pilot, by definition you 
do that a little bit.  If you can get the preparation right, you can get the 
exclusions and exemptions right and be upfront about those and be very 
clear with customers, that is clearly half the battle, managing expectations. 
 Any time lags, delays or suspensions in the programme are likely to generate 
high levels of tenant dissatisfaction and anxiety, given the fact that this will be 
the most important financial transaction most of them will have been involved in.  
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 Associations will need to ensure that their procedures for fraud protection and 
detection are robust in advance of the launch of the VRTB programme. There 
are good practice exemplars here among the pilots.   The introduction of the VRTB may prompt a sharp increase in preserved right to 
buy applications which will affect those associations that have a high proportion 
of their stock acquired through stock transfer. 
10.4. Outcomes of VRTB 
 Certain property types in certain locations are likely to be over-represented in 
sales: associations will need to build this into their business planning to estimate 
the implications for the future profile of their properties let at social rents, and for 
their development programmes.   VRTB may pose a financial risk to some tenants.  There is evidence that some 
may be overreaching significantly because of mortgage lending practices (e.g. 
high income to mortgage ratios combined with low savings, no buffer or 
consideration to future interest rates and so on).  The pilot raises questions 
about industry lending practices in some markets.  The report therefore suggests that housing associations will need to think 
carefully about advice and support for tenants who might take on risky 
borrowing to pay for their home. This support could include ‘affordability checks’ 
to highlight areas of concern.  Managing affordability concerns is likely to be 
challenging if tenants are keen to buy but feel they are being constrained by 
their association.   Associations will need to ensure that modelling the impact of VRTB is 
customised, to take into account regional and local variations in take-up, 
reviewed when initial completions are made.  The difference between higher 
and lower value housing markets in the provision of mortgages at high multiples 
of household income is one such source of local variation that will affect take-up.  VRTB presents an opportunity that should be grasped to address some of the 
problems that emerged with the statutory RTB scheme, for example restricting 
sub-letting to avoid rapid transfer of properties into the private rented sector, 
introducing overage clauses, and fraud prevention and proof of eligibility 
measures that offer greater protection against abuse of the scheme.  
The central lesson from this research for the regional pilot and the eventual national 
scheme is the need for as much clarity as possible at the launch of the programme 
on eligibility, access to discounts, the availability of funding, the prioritisation of 
applications, and the requirements for the portable discount.  A lack of clarity will 
make it difficult for associations to plan effectively for all aspects of VRTB and 
increase the risk of widespread tenant dissatisfaction in a context of raised 
expectation.  The imperative was summed up by one stakeholder in a single word: 
certainty. 
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A2 Appendix 1: The Governance Structure of the 
VRTB Programme  
 
 
 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 78 
 
A2 Appendix 2: Schemes to 
support access to owner 
occupation 
A range of different schemes have been introduced to help social housing tenants access 
owner occupation. The key features of the main schemes are summarised below. 
Statutory Right to Buy  
The statutory Right to Buy scheme for local authority tenants was first introduced by the 
Housing Act 1980. Local authority tenants who met the qualifying criteria received the Right 
to Buy their home at a discount. Various aspects of the scheme have changed over time 
including the qualifying period for length of tenancy and the level of discount available. "In 
England the current Right to Buy scheme is governed by the Housing Act 1985 (as 
amended)".49 The Right to Buy has been abolished in Scotland and the Welsh government 
have stated their intention to discontinue the scheme. "Northern Ireland has a Right to Buy 
scheme in place for both Housing Executive (the largest social housing provider) and 
housing association tenants. It is called the House Sales Scheme".50 
Right to Acquire 
The Right to Acquire for housing association tenants was introduced in 1996. This gave 
some housing association tenants the opportunity to purchase their property in specific 
circumstances. The Right to Acquire only applies to properties built with Social Housing 
Grant after April 1997. Tenants qualified for this after two years but the available discounts 
were much lower than under the statutory Right to Buy.  
                                               
49
 House of Commons Library (2016) Comparison of Right to Buy policies in England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7174/CBP-7174.pdf  
50
 House of Commons Library (2016) Comparison of Right to Buy policies in England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7174/CBP-7174.pdf  
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Preserved Right to Buy 
Many local authority properties have been transferred to the ownership of housing 
associations. "Where the tenant was previously a secure council tenant at the point at which 
ownership of the property was transferred to a housing association – these tenants have a 
‘preserved’ Right to Buy".51 Discounts for the preserved Right to Buy are the same as under 
the statutory scheme for local authority tenants. 
Voluntary Right to Buy 
"As a general rule, assured tenants of housing associations (aside from those who were 
previously secure council tenants with a “preserved” RTB) do not have the RTB on the same 
terms as council tenants".52 The voluntary agreement between the NHF and the government 
in 2015 is intended to address this issue. Housing Association tenants who did not already 
qualify for the preserved Right to Buy would now have the opportunity to access the Right to 
Buy. Discounts for the VRTB pilot were in line with those for the statutory RTB (rather than 
the Right to Acquire). 
 
                                               
51
 House of Commons Library (2016) Extending a voluntary Right to Buy to housing association tenants 
(England), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7224/CBP-7224.pdf  
52
 House of Commons Library (2016) Extending a voluntary Right to Buy to housing association tenants 
(England), http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7224/CBP-7224.pdf 
